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I. INTRODUCTION
Several studies indicate that few, if any, assets are available to
pay unsecured creditors in the vast majority of bankruptcies.' This is
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author would like
to thank Victor Gold, Lary Lawrence, Dan Schechter, and Bruce Markell for their comments
on earlier drafts of this Article. The research assistance of several individuals is much
appreciated, in particular Julia Kress, Jeffrey Hughes, James Orland, and Jill Olla. Finally,
the author would like to thank Loyola Law School for its financial support.
1. See, e.g., TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 199-229 (1989); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full
Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Parts I & 2, 57 AM.
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the case even though the Bankruptcy Code provides the bankruptcy
trustee2 with an array of powers designed to maximize the property
available to pay creditors of the bankruptcy estate. For example, the
bankruptcy trustee may assert claims that the debtor3 had against
third parties before the debtor went into bankruptcy.' In addition, in
order to avoid fraud5 and preferences of one creditor over others the
bankruptcy trustee is specifically empowered to avoid some transfers
of property made by the debtor to third parties before the bankruptcy
proceeding. The trustee may even "step into the shoes" of a creditor
and avoid the debtor's transfers of property or property interests that
could have been avoided by the creditor outside of bankruptcy.7
One way to bring additional assets into otherwise barren bank-
ruptcy estates would be to permit the bankruptcy trustee to assert
claims that creditors of the debtor have against third parties. This is a
viable option only if successful assertion of the claims would reduce
the aggregate amount of creditors' claims against the bankruptcy
estate. Many cases arise in which creditors have claims against a
debtor who is jointly liable with a solvent third party. For example, a
creditor (or group of creditors) may have a claim against a corporate
debtor that is also assertable against the corporation's controlling
shareholder on an alter ego theory. Alternatively, creditors may have
an action based on fraud or breach of fiduciary duty in which the
debtor and a third party are jointly and severally liable.
Consider a case of fraud in which a third party, a bank, has
assisted the debtor in misleading investors. Assume that the debtor
is a food distribution corporation interested in raising money for its
BANKR. L.J. 99 (1983); see also James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of
Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MIcH. L.
REV. 2097, 2098 n.2 (1990) (arguing that the problem of zero collections in bankruptcy cannot
be cured by tinkering with the bankruptcy law).
2. A debtor in possession may also perform the duties of the bankruptcy trustee in a case
under Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988).
3. Throughout this Article, the term "debtor" refers to the person who is in bankruptcy,
either voluntarily or involuntarily. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). "Under paragraph (1) of subsection (a), the estate is
comprised of all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property, wherever located, as of the
commencement of the case .... It includes ... causes of action . . . and all other forms of
property currently specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act. S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5868.
5. Fraudulent transfers may be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988) or 11 U.S.C.
§ 544(b) (1988) if a creditor of the debtor exists who could avoid the transfer under state
fraudulent transfer law. See Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent
Transfer Law, 8 BANKR. DEV. L.J. 55 (1991).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988).
8. This hypothetical is roughly based on Williams v. California First Bank, 859 F.2d 664
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operations and, more important, for the benefit of its promoters. The
debtor sells "investment contracts" and promissory notes which guar-
antee a very favorable rate of return for investors. The debtor uses a
bank as a depositary for the investors' funds and refers potential
investors to a bank officer who provides a glowing, but inaccurate,
picture of the debtor's operations. The bank officer is familiar with
the details of the investment program and either knows, or should
know, that the investment program is doomed to fail. Initially, the
investment program is successful; many investors contribute varying
amounts of money amounting to several million dollars. The initial
investors are quite pleased to receive the promised high rate of return,
at least initially.
Unfortunately for the investors, they were paid with funds pro-
vided by later investors through a type of pyramid scheme. Before
long, not enough investors could be found to sustain the pyramid.
The debtor's business eventually collapses and goes into bankruptcy.
The promoters flee with substantial funds and cannot be found.
In the bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor's bankruptcy trustee
oversees a bleak situation. The debtor's assets are worth only a few
thousand dollars. The debtor's liabilities are substantial, including
unpaid employees and food suppliers. The debtor owes money to the
bank involved in the fraud in unrelated loan transactions. The credi-
tors owed by far the most money are the disappointed investors.
These creditors invested amounts ranging from a few thousand to sev-
eral hundred thousand dollars with no return. Some of the investors
dealt with the debtor's bank and the faithless bank officer, while
others dealt directly with the unscrupulous promoters. Sophisticated
investors confer with counsel about ways to retrieve their lost funds,
while others are simply distraught and unaware of any possible
recourse. The smaller investors do not have sufficient funds to retain
counsel. The only way for the trustee to bring assets into the estate
would be to assert any claims that the investors might have against
the bank for assisting the promoters in defrauding the investors.
Bankruptcy trustees often attempt to assert such claims without
success.9 The problem lies in finding statutory authority that permits
claim assertion. Courts are generally unwilling to permit the trustee
to assert the claim unless it involves a voidable "transfer" of property
(9th Cir. 1988), in which the court denied the bankruptcy trustee standing to assert fraud
claims against a third party that were assigned by the debtor's creditors to the trustee.
9. See, e.g., Caplin v. Marine Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416 (1972); Williams v.
California First Bank, 859 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1988); Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark
Restaurant Equipment Co.), 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987); In re E.F. Hutton Southwest
Properties II, Ltd., 103 Bankr. 808 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
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or the debtor itself could have asserted it outside of bankruptcy."° In
the above hypothetical, the debtor could not assert a securities fraud
claim outside of bankruptcy because it was not defrauded; the third
party and the debtor jointly defrauded some of the debtor's creditors.
In addition, the securities fraud did not involve a voidable transfer of
property from the debtor to the bank. Accordingly, the trustee can-
not point to a provision in the Bankruptcy Code that permits such a
claim." As a result, there is very little available in the bankruptcy
estate for the creditors. The individual investors must pursue their
own claims, if any, against the bank. The small investors may not
even be aware that they have a claim, and it may not be worthwhile
for them to pursue such a claim even if they are aware of it.
In a case like this, it is tempting to say that the Bankruptcy Code
improperly limits the powers of the trustee. The trustee's successful
assertion of the investors' claim against the bank would result in a
significant increase in available assets to pay the creditors, the orderly
and efficient administration of the claims through their consolidation
and a greater probability of asset maximization for all creditors, not
simply the large investors who could be counted on to assert a claim
against the bank on their own behalf.
The trustee, however, may not be the best person to assert the
investors' claims. The trustee often lacks knowledge of the facts
underlying specific claims, and not all of the claims are based on the
same facts.12 Assertion of the claim against the bank may cause the
bank to sue the estate for indemnity or contribution, resulting in little
net gain for the estate.' 3 In addition, a claim against the bank belongs
to less than all of the creditors of the debtor. Since the trustee repre-
sents all of the creditors, it may be an inefficient or biased use of the
trustee's time and resources to prosecute the claim on behalf of the
investors. Or, if all creditors may share in the proceeds, 4 it may be
unfair to the investors to deprive them of the complete benefit of their
claim.
The potential of a bankruptcy trustee's assertion of creditors'
claims against third parties is not limited to cases of securities fraud.
Several recent cases have considered whether the trustee can assert
alter ego claims that creditors of a bankrupt corporation have against
10. See infra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
14. The current distributional rule in bankruptcy is that all creditors share in the proceeds
of claims asserted by the trustee. See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
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the corporation's controlling shareholder. 15 Other cases have consid-
ered the trustee's standing to assert civil RICO claims against third
parties who participated together with the debtor in a scheme to
harm third parties. 16 One recent case considered whether the bank-
ruptcy trustee could assert malpractice claims against the debtor's
accountants, whose allegedly negligent work harmed estate credi-
tors.17 In the future, questions may arise concerning the trustee's
ability to assert claims against buyers in bulk who fail to comply with
revised Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code if the seller winds
up in bankruptcy.'" Because of the many possible situations in which
a third party may be liable to creditors along with the bankrupt party,
the question of the trustee's standing to assert these claims looms
large.
The problem with current law is that it does not permit the bank-
ruptcy trustee or the courts to consider whether the assertion of a
damages claim against a third party would be in the best interest of
the bankruptcy estate. Instead, the Bankruptcy Code compels the
trustee to focus on whether a "transfer" can be avoided or on whether
the debtor could assert the claim outside of bankruptcy. While cur-
rent bankruptcy law might make it easier to determine which claims
the bankruptcy trustee can assert and which it cannot,' 9 there are
other claims that do not involve voidable transfers or that are assert-
able by the debtor which would be best asserted by the bankruptcy
trustee.
The next Part of this Article examines the "void" that exists in
the powers available to the bankruptcy trustee and a congressional
proposal to fill the void by expanding the trustee's powers to assert
damages claims on behalf of creditors against third parties. Part III
examines this proposal in light of the policies underlying the trustee's
current powers to avoid transfers of property and assert claims on
behalf of the bankruptcy estate. This Article proposes that in many
cases the assertion of damages claims is consistent with the power to
avoid transfers and to assert claims belonging to the estate, and that
Congress was correct when it considered expanding the trustee's pow-
15. See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
16. Compare In re E.F. Hutton Southwest Properties II, Ltd., 103 Bankr. 808 (N.D. Tex.
1989) (trustee denied standing to assert civil RICO claim) with Dana Molded Products v.
Brodner, 58 Bankr. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (trustee given standing to assert civil RICO claim).
17. See Holland v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 571 N.E.2d 777 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) (trustee
could not show damage to bankruptcy estate).
18. See infra notes 199-239 and accompanying text.
19. As the number of cases indicate, there are still disputes over whether a claim is
assertable by the trustee under current law. See infra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
19911
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ers. Finally, Part IV discusses how current law will likely affect
claims arising under new Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
and how the Bankruptcy Code might deal with them if the trustee's
powers were expanded to permit claims against third parties.
II. THE "VOID" IN AVOIDANCE POWERS
A. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co.
Probably the most significant case in which a court denied the
trustee the power to assert a claim for damages on behalf of creditors
of the bankruptcy estate is Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust
Co.20 This case illustrates the key problems addressed in this Article
and provides background for the proposed expansion of the trustee's
powers that was ultimately abandoned. In Caplin, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that a bankruptcy trustee was not empowered
by then-existing bankruptcy law to assert claims on behalf of creditors
against a third party, and that assertion of such a claim would not
necessarily be in the best interest of the bankruptcy estate. Four jus-
tices believed that the trustee did have power to assert the claim,
which was necessary in order to maximize the assets available to pay
creditors and shareholders of the bankrupt entity.
In Caplin, the bankrupt entity was Webb & Knapp, Inc.
("Webb"), a corporation engaged in various real estate activities in
the United States and Canada.2 In 1954, Webb had executed an
indenture with Marine Midland Trust Company of New York
("Marine Midland") that provided for Webb's public issuance of 5%
debentures 22 in the total amount of $8,607,600. The job of the inden-
ture trustee, in this case Marine Midland, was to make certain that
holders of publicly issued debt securities were protected pursuant to
the terms of the indenture and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.23 In
particular, the indenture trustee had to monitor the issuer -of the
indebtedness, in this case Webb, to make certain that there was no
default under the terms of the publicly issued debt.
The indenture provided that Webb would not
incur or assume "any indebtedness resulting from money borrowed
or from the purchase of real property or interests in real property
.. . or purchase any real property or interests in real property"
20. 406 U.S. 416 (1972); see also Lawrence B. Vineyard, Jr., Note, The ChapterX Trustee's
Standing To Sue-A Pragmatic Approach-Caplin v.. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 27
Sw. L.J. 510 (1973).
21. Caplin, 406 U.S. at 417.
22. A debenture is a type of unsecured debt instrument.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-77bbbb (1988).
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unless the company's consolidated tangible assets, as defined in the
indenture, equaled 200% of certain liabilities, after giving effect to
the contemplated indebtedness or purchase.24
The purpose of this provision was to make certain that holders of the
publicly issued debt would be protected from Webb incurring too
much additional indebtedness or expenditures for the purchase of real
property. Webb was to maintain liquidity sufficient to pay off the
holders of the debentures.
As indenture trustee, Marine Midland was required to act rea-
sonably in monitoring Webb's compliance with the terms of the
indenture, but in the absence of bad faith it could rely on the accuracy
of Webb's reports and certificates of compliance.25 Every year Webb
had to provide Marine Midland with a certificate stating whether
Webb had defaulted on any of its responsibilities under the
indenture.26
From 1959 to 1965, Webb suffered substantial financial losses.2 7
These losses ultimately caused Marine Midland to file a petition seek-
ing the involuntary reorganization of Webb under Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act, a predecessor to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code.28 The district court approved the petition and appointed a
trustee on May 18, 1965.29
Acting under the authority of the Bankruptcy Act and the super-
vision of the district court, the bankruptcy trustee conducted an
investigation which revealed that Webb had total assets of
$21,538,621 and total liabilities of $60,036,164 plus contingent tax lia-
bilities of $29,400,000.30 Included in the total liabilities were the 1954
debentures in the then-principal amount of $4,298,200 plus interest
subsequent to the beginning of the bankruptcy proceeding.31
Based on his investigation, the bankruptcy trustee determined
that Marine Midland had either willfully or negligently failed to mon-
itor Webb's business properly as required by the indenture.3 2 The
trustee alleged that Webb's yearly certificates of compliance with the
indenture's required 2:1 asset-liability ratio were fraudulent because
24. Caplin, 406 U.S. at 417.




29. Id. at 419.
30. Id.
31. Webb had paid off some of the principal of the outstanding debentures, which were
issued in the principal amount of $8,607,600. Id. at 419 n.9.
32. Id. at 419.
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they were based on grossly overvalued appraisals of real estate.3 3 The
trustee further alleged that Marine Midland knew or should have
known of the inflated appraisals, and that Webb suffered great finan-
cial loss by operating in violation of the indenture.34 These losses
impaired the ability of the debenture holders to obtain payment.
Based on these conclusions, the bankruptcy trustee sued Marine
Midland on behalf of the debenture holders, seeking to recover the
principal amount of the outstanding debentures." By recovering the
amount due on the outstanding debentures from Marine Midland,
more of Webb's assets would be available for the other creditors
under the reorganization plan. The debenture holders could be elimi-
nated as a class of creditors if they could be paid in full. Marine Mid-
land moved to dismiss the action claiming that the bankruptcy trustee
had no standing to assert claims on behalf of the debenture holders.
The district court and the court of appeals agreed with Marine Mid-
land, and dismissed the bankruptcy trustee's claim.36
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court rulings.37  The
majority rejected the theory that the statutes empowering the bank-
ruptcy trustee in reorganization proceedings authorized the trustee to
bring actions on behalf of creditors against third parties. The Court
noted that the trustee's duties were to report potential causes of action
"available to the estate" and to "collect and reduce to money the
property of the estates for which [he or she is trustee]. 38 Specifically,
the Court held that the trustee's power to act as a receiver in equity
did not include the power to act on behalf of the debenture holders;
the trustee could only assert claims that the debtor itself could have
asserted outside of bankruptcy.39 Since Webb, the debtor, could not
have asserted any claim against Marine Midland for failing to moni-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 420.
35. The bankruptcy trustee also filed a counterclaim in the same amount against Marine
Midland in the bankruptcy proceeding where Marine Midland had filed a claim for services
rendered. Further, the trustee objected to the claim for services and moved to compel an
accounting by Marine Midland. Id. at 420.
36. The district court had dismissed the bankruptcy trustee's counterclaim against Marine
Midland's claim for services rendered and denied the motion for an accounting. Id. at 420.
The district court permitted the bankruptcy trustee to object to Marine Midland's claim for
services rendered, but did not permit the trustee to seek affirmative recovery. Id. The court of
appeals upheld the district court decision on all issues. Id. at 421. The ability of the
bankruptcy trustee to object to Marine Midland's claim for services rendered did not reach the
Supreme Court for review. 406 U.S. at 421.
37. Justice Marshall delivered the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Br.ennan, White, and Blackmun joined. 406 U.S. at 416.
38. Id. at 428-29 (citing II U.S.C. §§ 567(3), 110, 75 (1938)).
39. Id. at 429 (citing I I U.S.C. § 587 (1938)).
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tor its own compliance with the terms of the indenture, the trustee
had no claim against Marine Midland.
The Court stressed several practical problems with permitting
the bankruptcy trustee to assert the debenture holders' claim against
Marine Midland. First, the majority agreed with the appellate court
that if the trustee succeeded in his action, Marine Midland would be
paying the debt of another, Webb, and would be entitled to look to
Webb for reimbursement.' Essentially, several claimants would be
replaced by one big claimant. There would be no net gain for the
bankruptcy estate.
Another practical problem with permitting the bankruptcy
trustee to sue would be the determination of the amount of the deben-
ture holders' claims. The Court stated that the debenture holders'
claim against Marine Midland depended on how much they could
recover from Webb's bankruptcy estate.4 ' The debenture holders
would have a claim against Marine Midland only to the extent that
they failed to recover from the estate. For example, if a debenture
holder with a $1,000 debenture could recover $500 from Webb, it
would then have a claim for only $500 against Marine Midland. The
bankruptcy trustee could reasonably assert the claim on behalf of the
debenture holders only after the reorganization was far enough along
so that a competent approximation could be made of the debenture
holders' losses.42 The debenture holders' recovery would not affect
Webb's other creditors because nothing could be recovered from
Marine Midland until the debenture holders had obtained their enti-
tled share from the bankruptcy estate. Since the only parties affected
were the debenture holders, only they could decide whether to sue
Marine Midland for the balance due on the debentures, and which
legal strategy to pursue.43
Finally, the Court noted that permitting the bankruptcy trustee
to assert the action on behalf of the debenture holders could lead to
inconsistent actions, because the bankruptcy trustee's suit would not
preclude the individual debenture holders from bringing their own
actions against Marine Midland." The Court doubted that the
trustee and all of the debenture holders would agree on the amount of
damages to seek or on the legal strategy to pursue.45
40. Id. at 430.
41. Id. at 431.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 431-32.
45. The Court noted that the debenture holders had already brought three private actions
that raised claims not asserted by the bankruptcy trustee. Id. at 432 n.21. The Court was also
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In affirming the decisions of the lower courts, the Supreme Court
left to Congress the question of the bankruptcy trustee's standing to
assert claims on behalf of creditors. The Court recognized that Con-
gress could permit the bankruptcy trustee to assert claims such as
those held by the Webb debenture holders but had chosen not to do
so. 4 6 In giving the trustee the power to assert those claims, Congress
could consider the practical problems raised by the Court before such
issues arose in the context of litigation.47
The dissenters, led by Justice Douglas, believed that the bank-
ruptcy trustee had the authority to assert the debenture holders'
claims. That authority flowed from his power to "make the necessary
investigations concerning the debtor, the operation of its business, and
the desirability of its continuance 'and any other matter relevant to
the proceeding or to the formulation of a plan, and report thereon to
the judge.' "48 Under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee
in a reorganization had to formulate a reorganization plan that deter-
mined the relative entitlements of creditors and equity security hold-
ers from the reorganized company. The dissent stated that the trustee
would be unable to determine how much would be available for the
creditors and equity security holders without first determining the
rights of the debenture holders. 9
The dissent noted that if the bankruptcy trustee were to prevail
on his claim against Marine Midland, an entire class of creditors, the
debenture holders, would be eliminated from the plan of reorganiza-
tion. 0 Therefore, claims against the estate would be reduced by
$4,298,200, giving the remaining claimants a larger share of the
estate's assets. If there was partial recovery, there would be a pro
rata change in the relative positions of the creditors.5 In some cases,
successful assertion of a claim on behalf of creditors could eliminate
those creditors from the reorganization plan altogether and leave
enough assets to permit even the equity security holders to
participate. 52
concerned about the trustee suing former officers of Webb. The Court thought that in settling
the cases with the officers, the trustee might take positions adverse to the debenture holders.
Id.
46. Id. at 434-35.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 435 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 567 (1938)).
49. Id. at 438-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 438.
51. Id.
52. Justice Douglas noted that the "absolute-priority rule," which requires senior interests
to be made whole before junior interests can participate in a reorganization, requires the
creditors' interests to be fully protected before the stockholders are paid. Id. at 436 n.2.
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The dissent envisioned the possibility of the debenture holders
taking the initiative to assert claims against Marine Midland and thus
removing themselves from the reorganization plan. But the dissent
argued that "such matters should not be left to happenstance.15 3
After all, the Bankruptcy Act made the reorganization trustee respon-
sible for "taking an inventory of assets available to the several claim-
ants and providing what plan would be fair and equitable in light of
the security of some claimants or the payment of claims rightfully due
them." 54
The dissent found no merit in the majority's argument that the
reorganization trustee's successful assertion of the debenture holders'
claim would necessarily give Marine Midland a subrogation claim of
equal amount, since the claim against Marine Midland alleged willful
misconduct or gross negligence." 5 Accordingly, Marine Midland as
the indenture trustee may well have had its claim in bankruptcy
wholly disallowed or subordinated to other creditors if it breached
fiduciary obligations.5 6 Moreover, under general principles of equity,
courts are unlikely to subrogate a culpable indenture trustee in order
to prevent unjust enrichment with funds otherwise destined for inno-
cent creditors or stockholders."' Assuming that the bankruptcy
trustee's allegations were true, Marine Midland could not show
"clean hands."5"
The dissenting justices would have permitted the bankruptcy
trustee to assert the debenture holders' claims against Marine Mid-
land because the assertion would be in the best interest of the reorgan-
ization proceeding. However, the dissent failed to address some of the
arguments raised by the majority, such as whether the bankruptcy
trustee could bind all of the debenture holders in the litigation with
Marine Midland or whether an action could be brought before deter-
mining Webb's ability to pay the debenture holders.
B. The Proposal to Fill the Void Left by Caplin
In its comprehensive study of the bankruptcy laws, the Commis-
53. Id. at 439.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. For many years, courts have subordinated, or in some cases disallowed, claims of
creditors if the creditors' misconduct harmed the other creditors. In these cases, the creditor
whose claim is disallowed or subordinated usually acts with or controls the debtor in a manner
that furthers the interest of the controlling creditor at the expense of other creditors. See
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (controlling stockholder's claim against debtor
corporation disallowed because of inequitable conduct in dealing with creditors of the debtor).
57. 406 U.S. at 440 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
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sion on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States accepted the Cap-
lin opinion's invitation to specifically empower the bankruptcy trustee
to assert creditor's claims against third parties. 9 The Commission's
proposal was as follows:
The trustee may, when in the best interest of the estate, enforce any
claim which any class of creditors has against any person and if
necessary for that purpose, the court may stay any other pending
action on such claims. If the trustee brings an action on such a
claim, he shall give notice to all creditors who could have brought
an action on the claim if the trustee had not done so. Any judg-
ment entered for or against the trustee on such claim shall be bind-
ing on all such creditors and any recovery by the trustee shall be
for the benefit only of such creditors after the deduction of all
expenses incurred by the trustee in effecting such recovery. 60
The commentary to the proposed section indicated the Commission's
intention to overrule Caplin, suggesting that it is in the best interest of
the estate for the trustee to assert claims if recovery would "reduce or
eliminate some claims against the estate and thus enhance dividends
for other creditors or improve the prospect for rehabilitation of the
debtor.
61
The Commission's proposal sought to address some of the practi-
cal problems Caplin raised. The proposed statute provided that the
trustee's action on behalf of creditors would be binding on the credi-
tors. Accordingly, the individual creditors would be barred from
asserting individual claims against the liable third party.62 The com-
mentary also stated that a claim should not be asserted if successful
prosecution would result in the third party's subrogation to the claims
of the creditors, because assertion of the claim under those circum-
stances would not result in a net gain for the estate.63
A version of the Commission's proposal appeared in the House
of Representatives' proposed new Bankruptcy Code.6' The House
proposal, which would have been Section 544(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code, was somewhat more specific than the Commission's proposal.
The statute (as opposed to the commentary) provided that the trustee
could not assert a claim on behalf of creditors if it would lead to a
valid subrogation claim of the third party against the bankruptcy
59. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 201 (1973).
60. Id. pt. 2, at 160.
61. Id. at 161.
62. Id. at 160.
63. Id. at 161.
64. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 416-17 (1977) (proposing section 544(c)(3)).
[Vol. 46:263
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estate.6" The clear intent of the proposed statute was to overrule
Caplin.
When the House and Senate conferred to finalize the new Bank-
ruptcy Code, the proposed section 544(c) was omitted without expla-
nation.66 The new Code did not contain a provision that expressly
expanded the bankruptcy trustee's power to assert damages claims on
behalf of creditors against third parties. It has been suggested that
Section 544(c) was dropped because of opposition from the banking
lobby; Marine Midland was a bank.67 If banks were opposed to sec-
tion 544(c), they may have anticipated that they would defend actions
brought by trustees more often than they would benefit from such
actions. Alternatively, banks may simply prefer asserting their own
causes of action rather than having the trustee assert them on their
65. Proposed section 544(c) reads as follows:
(c) (1) The trustee may enforce any cause of action that a creditor, a class of
creditors, an equity security holder, or a class of equity security holders has
against any person, if-
(A) the trustee could not recover against such person on such cause of
action other than under this subsection;
(B) recovery by the trustee for the benefit of such creditor or equity
security holder or the members of such class will reduce the claim or
interest of such creditor or equity security holder or of such members, as
the case may be, against or in the estate;
(C) there is a reasonable likelihood that recovery against such person will
not create an allowable claim in favor of such person against the estate;
and
(D) enforcement of such cause of action is in the best interest of the
estate.
(2) If the trustee brings an action on such cause of action-
(A) the court, after notice and a hearing, may stay the commencement or
continuation of any other action on such cause of action; and
(B) the clerk shall give notice to all creditors or equity security holders
that could have brought an action on such cause of action if the trustee
had not done so.
(3) A judgment in any such action brought by the trustee binds all creditors or
equity security holders that could have brought an action on such cause of
action. Any recovery by the trustee, less any expense incurred by the trustee in
effecting such recovery, shall be for the benefit only of such creditors or equity
security holders.
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 416-17 (1977).
66. The only reference to proposed section 544(c) was as follows: "The House amendment
deletes section 544(c) of the House bill." 124 CONG. REC. S17,406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)
(remarks of Senator DeConcini upon introducing Senate amendment to House amendment to
H.R. 8200), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6525. See Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark
Restaurant Equipment Co.), 816 F.2d 1222, 1228 n.10 (8th Cir. 1987).
67. See WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE ON BANKRUPTCY, CRITIQUE OF THE FIRST
DECADE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND AGENDA FOR REFORM 225 (1988) (comment
of Mr. Levin).
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behalf. Without a written explanation for the omission of section
544(c), the motives of Congress are left to speculation.
Since the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code, most courts and
commentators continue to believe that the rule of Caplin is still alive.
For example, in Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip-
ment Co.),68 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
bankruptcy trustee had no standing under the Bankruptcy Code to
assert creditors' claims against the corporate debtor's principal share-
holders and officers using an alter ego theory. Under such a theory,
creditors may pierce the corporate veil of limited liability for share-
holders and officers if the individuals involved used the corporation
only as an instrumentality to conduct their own personal business.69
Whether a shareholder may be held liable on an alter ego theory
depends on the facts of the individual case and on state law. Several
factors may lead to application of the alter ego doctrine, including
undercapitalization of the corporation, misrepresentation of the cor-
porate structure to creditors, failure to follow corporate formalities
(such as obtaining authority to issue stock), and unauthorized diver-
sion of corporate funds or assets. ° In some cases, an alter ego action
may bring the personal assets of corporate promoters into the bank-
ruptcy estate, thus increasing the assets available to pay the creditors
of the bankrupt corporation.
In Mixon, the bankruptcy trustee accused the controlling share-
holders of abusing the corporation for their own personal benefit and
to the detriment of the corporation's creditors. II The corporation was
grossly undercapitalized and transacted with some of the controlling
shareholder's other businesses on extremely favorable terms. 2 The
court determined, however, that under relevant state corporation law,
an action under an alter ego theory belonged not to the corporation
but to the individual creditors of the corporation. 3 Accordingly, the
trustee had no power to assert the claim on behalf of the creditors.
68. 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987).
69. See id. at 1225 (citing 1 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA ON THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.10 (1983)); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS
OF CORPORATIONS § 146 (1983).
70. See Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 814-15 (Ct.
App. 1962); CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS § 298.01 (R. Bradbury Clark ed., 4th ed.
1991).
71. 816 F.2d at 1223.
72. Ozark Restaurant Equipment never made a profit, and its net worth plummeted from
negative $1,400 in 1980 to negative $146,000 in 1982. The corporation allegedly failed to keep
adequate books and records, distributed false financial statements, failed to pay taxes, and
failed to hold regular meetings of the shareholders and directors. 816 F.2d at 1224 n.4.
73. Id. at 1225.
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The Eighth Circuit noted that in enacting the Bankruptcy Code,
Congress had failed to accept the Caplin majority opinion's invitation
to empower the bankruptcy trustee to assert claims on behalf of credi-
tors against third parties. 4 The court pointed out that section 544 of
the Bankruptcy Code authorizes bankruptcy trustees to exercise the
power of judicial lien creditors, to act as bona fide purchasers of real
property and to avoid transfers of the debtor's property or obligations
incurred by the debtor that can be avoided by an actual creditor of the
debtor under state law."' Furthermore, the court noted that the
trustee can assert causes of action that the debtor could have asserted
outside of bankruptcy because those causes of action are "property of
the estate."76 None of these provisions, however, included the power
to assert a claim for damages on behalf of creditors against a third
party.
77
74. Id. at 1222.
75. Id. at 1226-30. Section 544 provides:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without
regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers
of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred
by the debtor that is voidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with
respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on
a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not
such a creditor exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and with respect to
such credit, an execution against the debtor that is returned unsatisfied at
such time, whether or not such a creditor exists; or
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the
debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected,
that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such
transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such
a purchaser exists.
(b) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or
any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a
creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this
title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.
II U.S.C. § 544 (1988).
76. 816 F.2d at 1225. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988) provides that the estate includes "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."
77. 816 F.2d at 1230; accord E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979 (11th Cir. 1990)
(trustee did not have standing to assert fraud claims against third parties arising out of a Ponzi
scheme); Williams v. California First Bank, 859 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1988) (trustee did not have
standing to assert securities fraud claims on behalf of creditors against third party even though
creditors assigned claims to trustee).
At least two courts have suggested that the bankruptcy trustee's broad power to represent
creditors under Bankruptcy Code § 544 allows the trustee to assert claims that are common to
all creditors, including alter ego actions. See Koch Ref. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., 831
F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Western World Funding, Inc., 52 Bankr. 743 (Bankr. D. Nev.
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Assuming that the Bankruptcy Code does not overrule Caplin,
why bar the trustee from asserting creditors' claims against third par-
ties when the trustee has other similar powers designed to maximize
the assets available to pay creditors? Is there much difference
between allowing the trustee to assert a claim on behalf of the debtor
against a third party if the debtor could have asserted it outside of
bankruptcy and allowing the trustee to assert a claim held by a sub-
stantial number of creditors if it significantly reduces the amount of
claims against the debtor? In Part III, this Article examines the pro-
posed section 544(c) in light of the policies supporting the trustee's
currently existing powers. Specifically, would assertion by the trustee
of creditors' claims against third parties increase assets available for
distribution and lead to a more equitable distribution of those assets?
Would assertion of such claims lead to more or less efficient adminis-
tration of the bankruptcy estate?
III. ASSERTION OF DAMAGES CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF
CREDITORS AND THE BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE'S
CURRENT POWERS
A. The Role of the Bankruptcy Trustee's Avoidance Powers and
Ability to Assert Claims in the Bankruptcy Scheme
At the outset, it is useful to try to understand why the trustee
may assert any claims on behalf of creditors and has some powers that
no creditor can assert outside of bankruptcy.7" It is, of course, possi-
ble to imagine a bankruptcy system in which the individual adminis-
tering the bankruptcy, the trustee, could not assert any claims
whatsoever against third parties. Whatever assets belonged to the
debtor at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed would be distrib-
uted to the creditors according to some system of priority that may or
may not be pro rata. For example, assume that the debtor had a via-
ble $100,000 claim against a third party for breach of contract when it
filed its bankruptcy petition. The trustee could distribute the claim to
the creditors by assigning it to them according to the bankruptcy pri-
1985). It has been argued that Caplin is distinguishable from cases in which all creditors can
assert a claim; the debenture holders in Caplin did not constitute all of the creditors holding
claims against Webb. In addition, the Court in Caplin did not expressly consider the power of
the trustee to act on behalf of all creditors of the estate. See infra notes 107-11 and
accompanying text.
78. For example, it is generally permissible under non-bankruptcy law for a debtor to
prefer one creditor over others. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3432 (West 1970). In bankruptcy,
such preferential payments made within designated time periods can be avoided by the




ority system. The creditors could then prosecute the claim
themselves.
Several problems might exist with such a system. The claim may
be assigned to a large number of creditors who disagree on the way to
prosecute the claim. Furthermore, it may be difficult to determine
whether the claim has merit-what might appear to be a claim worth
$100,000 may be worthless either because the third party is not liable
or is unable to pay. Further, the creditors who have the misfortune of
receiving the purported $100,000 claim will benefit less than the credi-
tors who receive $100,000 in hard assets, assuming any hard assets
exist. In these cases, it probably makes more sense to permit the
bankruptcy trustee to liquidate the claim against the third party and
distribute whatever is obtained to the creditors in accordance with the
bankruptcy distribution system.
Alternatively, the trustee might receive broad powers to assert
claims, held by a creditor against a third party, that may reduce that
creditor's claim against the debtor. For example, in cases of debts
guaranteed by a third party, the trustee would assert the guarantee for
the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. Assume that a debtor owes one
creditor $50,000 and the debt is guaranteed by a third party. Further,
assume that the debtor has defaulted and filed for bankruptcy. The
trustee might be permitted to sue the third party and obtain $50,000
for the creditor or, perhaps, for the entire estate, leaving the creditor
"protected" by the guarantee to stand in line with the other creditors.
Such an action would either remove one creditor holding a $50,000
claim from the estate or provide $50,000 in additional assets for the
rest of the creditors.
The problem with such a rule is that once the guarantor paid, it
would be entitled to a claim against the estate for an equal amount.79
One creditor of the estate would be replaced by aniother and there
would be no net gain for the bankruptcy estate. In addition, it may be
unfair to force the creditor who could enforce the guarantee outside of
bankruptcy to share the proceeds with others because this creditor
extended and priced the credit based on the assurance that if the
debtor failed to pay, the guarantor would pay in full. Accordingly, it
makes sense to prohibit the trustee from asserting the guarantee on
behalf of other creditors of the estate.
Somewhere between these two situations exists a line separating
claims which should be asserted by the bankruptcy trustee from those
79. 11 U.S.C. § 509(a) (1988) provides, with some exceptions, that "an entity that is liable
with the debtor on, or that has secured, a claim of a creditor against the debtor, and that pays
such claim, is subrogated to the rights of such creditor to the extent of such payment."
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which should not. In determining where to draw the line, the bank-
ruptcy trustee's powers should be analyzed within the policies that
drive the bankruptcy system. While it is difficult to find a single pol-
icy or philosophy to explain the bankruptcy system,80 it can be viewed
as a way to facilitate the open credit economy, providing for the
orderly payment of debts and for relief from overly burdensome
debt.a
The bankruptcy system seeks to provide an orderly procedure for
determining how much an entity that is unable or unwilling to pay its
debts owes each entity claiming an amount due and whether in fact
there is any amount due.8 2 Bankruptcy law establishes a priority sys-
tem for the distribution of limited assets among creditorsa 3 It pro-
vides some predictability for the creditors and debtors by informing
them of their respective rights in limited assets if debts cannot be paid
in full.a4 To some extent, bankruptcy relieves both creditors and debt-
ors from the destructive seizure of assets by creditors who seek full
repayment when they sense that the debtor might be insolvent.8 5 Loss
is spread among creditors rather than assigned to any one creditor
80. See H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 59, at 61.
Instead of striving for a comprehensive framework for assessing the bankruptcy
process, such astute observers as Glenn and Radin have sought to isolate the
"essentials" or "nature" of bankruptcy. Glenn has emphasized the "well worn
propositions ... [of] the fraudulent debtor ... [and] the concept of the debtor
who is within the control of the court." Radin has expanded these essentials:
"Unless we intend to bring [all of] the creditors into one large group, and adjust
their common claims to a fund consisting of a single debtor's property, there is
no reason to have recourse to bankruptcy."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Recently, several scholars have debated the philosophical underpinnings of bankruptcy
law. Some scholars, most notably Professor Baird and Dean Jackson, seek to explain bank-
ruptcy as an economically efficient way to divide limited assets of a financially distressed entity
among diverse creditors. Accordingly, they argue that bankruptcy distribution rules should
generally not vary from state debtor-creditor law unless the variance increases the pool of
assets available for distribution. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bank-
ruptcy: A Reply To Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987). Professor Bowers suggests that if
the goal of bankruptcy is to increase the amount of assets of the bankrupt entity to facilitate an
efficient distribution of assets among creditors, it is doomed to failure. Debtors can do a more
efficient job of distributing their own limited assets. See Bowers, supra note 1. Others argue
that bankruptcy law reflects the concerns of the diverse participants in the bankruptcy process,
which involves more than a question of how to distribute a pool of assets. See, e.g., Donald R.
Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717
(1991); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987).
81. See H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 59, at 62.
82. Id. at 61.
83. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
84. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 59, at 75.
85. Id.
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alone. 6 The bankruptcy system attempts to administer claims and
distribution of assets efficiently. In some cases, the debtor receives
relief to enable it to become a more productive participant in the open
credit economy, both as a producer and as a consumer.87 Ideally, the
system should operate at low cost and provide for a speedy and expert
resolution of disputes.8Some commentators have asserted that bankruptcy laws have
developed because creditors prefer the collective nature of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding.89 Creditors would rather receive a pro-rata recov-
ery of the debtor's estate in bankruptcy than engage in a race of
diligence with other creditors in which some recover in full while
others recover nothing. 9 Dean Thomas Jackson uses a fishing hypo-
thetical to help explain why creditors would agree to the collective
nature of the bankruptcy process. 91 The hypothetical posits that it is
possible to catch all of the fish in a lake in one year and earn
$100,000.92 If some fish are left in the lake, however, they can multi-
ply and perhaps provide an annual annuity of $50,000 per year with a
present value of $500,000. 93 If the people who are fishing (creditors)
sense that all of the fish will be taken in one year by others (a business
in trouble), each person fishing will attempt to immediately catch as
many fish as possible.94 The people fishing will split $100,000 rather
than $500,000, not an optimal result.95
The Bankruptcy Code is thus like a Fish and Game Code in
which the state seeks to regulate each person fishing so as to maximize
the amount of fish available. The bankruptcy trustee can be viewed as
a game warden empowered to enforce the fishing regulations. The
bankruptcy trustee's ability to avoid preferential transfers is similar to
a game warden's power to prevent people from fishing out of season.96
86. Id. at 76-79.
87. Id. at 75.
88. Id. at 81-82.
89. See JACKSON, supra note 80, at 7-19; Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-
Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
90. A collective, compulsory system of debt collection might make more assets available
for distribution because sale of the debtor's business as a going concern may yield a higher
price than the piecemeal dismantling of the business, which would likely result in a first-come-
first-serve system. In addition, creditors tend to be risk averse and, for example, would rather
receive an assurance of a recovery of $12,500 rather than a 50-50 chance of $25,000 or nothing.
See JACKSON, supra note 80, at 10-16.
91. Id. at 11-13.
92. Id. at 11.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 12.
95. Id.
96. The trustee's ability to avoid preferential transfers arises from section 547(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which provides:
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The trustee's ability to assert claims on behalf of the estate against
third parties and avoid transfers of interests in property is equivalent
to the game warden's power to prevent people from fishing without a
license and from exceeding the limit on fish caught.97
The trustee's power to assert claims on behalf of the estate and
avoid some of the debtor's transfers of property plays an important
role in the bankruptcy process. As a result of this power, more assets
are brought into the estate, including some that have been fraudu-
lently hidden by the debtor, permitting more of the creditors' claims
to be paid. Additionally, the trustee's power to avoid fraudulent or
preferential transfers of the debtors' assets provides a more even dis-
tribution of assets among creditors.98
In proposing section 544(c), the House of Representatives and
the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States sought
to expand the bankruptcy trustee's power in a manner consistent with
bankruptcy policy, especially the policies of maximizing the assets
available to pay creditors and equitably distributing those assets. Pro-
posed section 544(c) also reflected the view that not all creditors'
claims should be asserted by the bankruptcy trustee. The trustee was
empowered to assert claims only if success would not result in an
allowable claim filed by the third party, and was otherwise in the best
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). For a discussion of preference rules and their role in the bank-
ruptcy system, see JACKSON, supra note 80, at 122-46.
97. For an explanation of the trustee's ability to act on behalf of actual and hypothetical
creditors in avoiding transfers of the debtor's assets, see infra notes 100-24 and accompanying
text.
98. The trustee's power to assert claims and avoid transfers of property may have an
impact on the amount of assets available to pay claims. In addition, it may provide for more
equitable sharing of assets among creditors, but it does not have much of an impact on the
"fresh start" rationale of bankruptcy, i.e., providing relief to the debtor from overly
burdensome indebtedness. See Thomas J. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 725, 727-31 (1984).
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interest of the estate.99 Unfortunately, the proposed section was not
entirely clear about what constituted the "best interest of the estate."
The following Part examines the policies underlying the trustee's
powers to determine whether proposed section 544(c) provides a more
satisfactory balance of bankruptcy policies than the Caplin rule for-
bidding the bankruptcy trustee from asserting creditors' claims
against third parties. It also examines the policies to determine more
specifically when assertion of a claim is in the best interest of the
estate.
B. Maximization of the Estate's Property
The trustee's powers to assert claims and avoid transfers of prop-
erty are designed to maximize the amount of assets available for dis-
tribution. " The trustee may assert claims owned by the debtor, and
recover some assets transferred by the debtor to third parties before
bankruptcy. If the claim has merit, the trustee recovers more assets,
so more of the creditors may be paid or the existing creditors may be
paid more. Assertion of damages claims on behalf of creditors against
third parties is closely analogous to the trustee's existing powers to
assert claims of the debtor and to avoid transfers of property that are
voidable by an actual creditor of the debtor.
As noted above, the bankruptcy trustee may assert any claims
which are property of the estate. 0 1 For example, if the debtor goes to
its financial grave with a viable cause of action for breach of contract
against a third party, the trustee can assert that claim on behalf of the
debtor. Assume that the claim is worth $100,000. Had the debtor
successfully asserted the claim outside of bankruptcy, $100,000 in
additional assets would have been available for all of the debtor's
creditors-at least if the assets were not squandered or successfully
hidden. In bankruptcy, the trustee is effectively asserting the claim on
behalf of the creditors against the liable third party, even if the credi-
tors themselves could not have asserted the claim. There is little dif-
ference between a claim that the debtor could assert outside of
bankruptcy and a claim that all creditors of the debtor could assert
against a third party-the ultimate beneficiaries are the same. 10 2
To demonstrate the similarity between claims belonging to the
99. H.R. 8200, supra note 64, at 416-17.
100. See Morris G. Shanker, The Abuse and Use of Federal Bankruptcy Power, 26 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 3, 28 (1975).
101. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
102. See Richard L. Epling, Trustee's Standing to Sue in Alter Ego or Other Damage
Remedy Actions, 6 BANKR. DEV. L.J. 191, 201-02 (1989).
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debtor and claims belonging to all creditors of the debtor, consider a
case similar to Mixon v. Anderson where the majority shareholder of a
corporation has caused the corporation to be grossly undercapital-
ized. As a result of misusing the corporate form, the shareholder is
liable to the creditors of the corporation on an alter ego theory under
relevant state corporation law. 10 3 If the controlling shareholder is sol-
vent, the bankruptcy trustee can bring additional assets into the estate
to pay the creditors by asserting an alter ego claim against the con-
trolling shareholder. In order to get around the Caplin standing prob-
lem, some courts (unlike the court in Mixon) have held, based on
little authority, that the bankrupt corporation itself has standing to
sue its own principals through an alter ego theory under state corpo-
ration law. 104 Thus, the debtor's cause of action is treated as property
of the estate and can be asserted by the bankruptcy trustee.
Cases in which courts hold that the trustee has standing on
behalf of the bankrupt corporation to sue the controlling shareholder
are based on the unique assumption that one can sue oneself. In these
cases the corporation and the shareholder are basically the same
entity, and it appears highly unlikely outside of bankruptcy that a
corporation would ever sue its controlling shareholder on an alter ego
theory. Alter ego theory benefits creditors of shell corporations and
provides an avenue for recovery from unscrupulous individuals who
seek to shield themselves from liability. Federal courts interpreting
103. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
104. In S.I. Acquisition v. Eastway Delivery Serv., 817 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987), a creditor
alleged that debtor S.I. Acquisition was actually the alter ego for the personal business affairs
of its principal shareholder. The creditor sought to hold the shareholder liable for the
creditor's claim against the debtor. The Fifth Circuit held that the creditor was stayed because
the alter ego claim qualified as property of the estate under Texas law and was assertable by
the bankruptcy trustee. The court noted, "not surprisingly," that it could not find any case in
which the corporation was allowed to assert an alter ego claim against its principal
shareholder. 817 F.2d at 1152. Nevertheless, the court held that finding a cause of action for
the corporation in these cases was consistent with the overall policy of holding a person liable
who misused the corporate form for the corporation's obligations.
Likewise, in St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Pepsico, 884 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989), the
Second Circuit found that under relevant Ohio law an alter ego claim belonged to the debtor
and the bankruptcy trustee, although it conceded that "no Ohio case directly addresses
whether a corporation may bring an alter ego action against its own parent." Id. at 703. The
court stated that the corporation's claim must be recognized or "the purpose of the alter ego
action would be frustrated." Id.; see also Steyr-Daimler-Puch of America Corp. v. Pappas, 852
F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1988).
These cases are contrary to Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co.),
816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987), in which the court held that the corporate debtor did not have
standing to assert the alter ego claim. See supra notes 68-77. The cases have also been
criticized as stretching state law to reach an equitable result, because alter ego claims are really
asserted by creditors of the corporation outside of bankruptcy, and not the corporation itself.
See Epling, supra note 102, at 197-98.
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state law may be stretching the law to permit bankruptcy trustees to
maximize property available for creditors by asserting causes of action
that really belong to the creditors. 105 In bankruptcy, whether the
alter ego cause of action belongs to the corporation or to the creditors
of the corporation, the beneficiaries are ultimately the creditors. If
section 544(c) had been adopted, it would not be necessary in the alter
ego cases to ask if the cause of action belonged to the corporation or
to the individual creditors; the trustee could have asserted the claim
as long as it was in the best interest of the estate.
Arguably, if a claim is common to all creditors, such as some
alter ego claims, the bankruptcy trustee can already assert the claim
under the so-called "strong arm" clause of Bankruptcy Code section
544(a). 10 6 That section gives the bankruptcy trustee the "rights and
powers" of a hypothetical lien creditor who extends credit and obtains
a lien at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed. 10 7 The section also
gives the trustee the powers of a creditor who extends credit at the
time the petition is filed and obtains a writ of execution against the
debtor that is returned unsatisfied."0 " Some courts and commentators
have suggested that in alter ego cases in which all creditors may assert
a claim against the controlling shareholder, the bankruptcy trustee
can assert the claim on their behalf as the general representative of all
creditors under the strong arm clause. 0 9
The trustee's ability to assert general causes of action on behalf of
creditors under the strong arm clause is subject to some dispute. Con-
gress' rejection of section 544(c) may indicate its intention to prevent
the trustee from asserting such claims." 0 In addition, the strong arm
clause is most frequently used to help the bankruptcy trustee take
priority over unperfected security interests and avoid some transfers
105. See Epling, supra note 102, at 197-98.
106. See infra note 109.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1988).
108. II U.S.C. § 544(a)(2) (1988).
109. See Koch Ref. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987); In re
Western World Funding, Inc., 52 Bankr. 743 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985); Steven E. Boyce, Koch
Refining and In re Ozark.- The Chapter 7 Trustee's Standing To Assert An Alter Ego Cause of
Action, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 315 (1990); WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 67, at 225-27 (comments of Mr. Klee).
Some commentators propose that a creditor with an unsatisfied execution is entitled to
bring a creditor's bill to reach property not leviable by a writ of execution. A creditor's bill
can be used to reach property that has been fraudulently transferred, and can also be used to
assert liability against the principal of a corporation through an alter ego theory. See In re
Western World Funding, Inc., 52 Bankr. at 773; Boyce, supra, at 321-22.
110. See Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co.), 816 F.2d 1222, 1229
(8th Cir. 1987); WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 67, at 226
(comment of Professor Baird).
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of property interests by the debtor."1 There is no tradition of bank-
ruptcy trustees attempting to assert damages claims on behalf of cred-
itors under the strong arm clause, and the ability of the trustee to
assert such claims under that provision is questionable at best.
In comparison to the trustee's inability to assert damages claims,
the trustee's power to assert avoidance claims on behalf of creditors
against third parties is clearly established.112 The trustee has the
power to "step into the shoes" of a creditor who has the power under
state law to avoid the debtor's transfer of property made prior to
bankruptcy, but failed to do so before the commencement of bank-
ruptcy." 3 This power was represented by section 70(e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, and has had the effect of forcing third parties who are
taking transfers of property from the debtor to disclose the transfer so
others who deal with the debtor are not misled. " 4 The subrogation of
the trustee to creditors' avoidance claims had more significance when
an unperfected security interest could be avoided by unsecured credi-
tors.115 Under the subrogation provision of former section 70(e), the
bankruptcy trustee could thus "undo" unperfected security inter-
111. See Mixon, 816 F.2d at 1229. The "strong arm clause" is important in that it gives the
trustee leverage in dealing with secured creditors of the debtor. Since secured creditors may
generally assert their security interests inside of bankruptcy, they can remove their collateral
from the distribution scheme. As a result, they are considered to have a "super priority" over
other creditors. In order for a secured creditor to be protected in bankruptcy, the security
interest must be perfected-that is, the secured creditor must either have possession of the
collateral or must have filed a public notice of the security interest. See U.C.C. §§ 9-303, -304,
-305 (1989). Outside of bankruptcy, an unsecured creditor can obtain priority over an
unperfected security interest by suing on its claim and obtaining a judicial lien against the
property subject to the unperfected security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1989). Since
the automatic stay in bankruptcy prevents unsecured creditors from obtaining such liens, the
trustee may obtain such a lien on behalf of the creditors generally, and take priority over an
unperfected security interest on behalf of the general creditors. See JACKSON, supra note 80, at
70-74. The trustee's ability to take priority over unperfected security interests thus brings
more property into the estate for the benefit of general unsecured creditors. But see John C.
McCoid II, Bankruptcy, the Avoiding Powers, and Unperfected Security Interests, 59 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 175 (1985) (criticizing the trustee's ability to take priority over such interests
because unsecured creditors cannot take priority over such interests outside bankruptcy).
112. Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a
creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this
title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988).
113. Id.
114. See Hearings on S. 235 & S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 4, 7 (1977)
(letter from Vern Countryman, Professor at Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Hearings].
115. See Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part II), 47 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 631, 656 (1972)
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ests." 6 Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, unsecured
creditors cannot avoid unperfected security interests, and the bank-
ruptcy trustee thus cannot avoid these interests under section
544(b)." 17
Today, the power to assert avoidance claims allows trustees to
nullify fraudulent transfers of property that are voidable under state
fraudulent transfer law but are not avoidable under section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code, illegal corporate dividends or stock purchases that
state law permits unsecured creditors to avoid, and bulk sales under
Uniform Commercial Code Article 6, if the jurisdiction has not
adopted one of the 1988 proposed alternatives of Article 6.118 Before
1988, Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code provided that a
bulk sale was ineffective as against the seller's creditors if a buyer of
goods failed to notify the creditors prior to transfer 19 of a seller's
merchandise. 2 0  If the seller ultimately filed for bankruptcy, the
seller's bankruptcy trustee could step into the shoes of the seller's
creditors and avoid the bulk sale, thus recovering the property that
was sold.' 2' Under this version of Article 6, the property recovered
benefits all creditors of the estate, not simply the creditor who could
have asserted the violation of the bulk transfer law outside of
bankruptcy. 22
116. See, e.g., Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
117. The Uniform Commercial Code provides that an unperfected security interest is
"subordinate to," among others, a bankruptcy trustee. U.C.C. § 9-301 (1989). Under Article
9, no one may "avoid" an unperfected security interest. If the trustee wants to avoid an
unperfected security interest, she can do so under section 544(a). See supra note 111.
118. See Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co.), 816 F.2d 1222, 1229
n.12 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Buchman v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 250 F. Supp. 60
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (alleged payment in violation of antidividend provision).
119. Under U.C.C. Article 6, in effect prior to 1988 (versions of which are still in effect in
the vast majority of jurisdictions at the time of this writing), a "bulk transfer" is defined as
"any transfer in bulk and not in the ordinary course of the transferor's business of a major part
of the materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory (Section 9-109) of an enterprise
subject to this Article." U.C.C. § 6-102(1) (1987). Covered enterprises are "all those whose
principal business is the sale of merchandise from stock, including those who manufacture
what they sell." U.C.C. § 6-102(3) (1987).
120. Under the former version of Article 6, only those creditors holding claims based on
transactions occurring before the bulk transfer are entitled to protection. U.C.C. § 6-109(1)
(1987).
121. See In re Verco Indus., 10 Bankr. 347 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part, 704 F.2d
1134 (9th Cir. 1983); Bryan D. Hull, Recommendation of the UCC Committee of the State Bar
of California: Article 6 Should Be Repealed, 41 ALA. L. REV. 701, 704-07 (1990).
122. The drafters of the new version of Uniform Commercial Code Article 6 - Alternative B
criticized the rule allowing recovery to all creditors as giving a windfall to those creditors who
could not have asserted the bulk sales claim outside of bankruptcy. See U.C.C. § 6-107 cmt. 2
(1989). Under the new version, only creditors who were affected by the violation of the bulk
sales law may assert the cause of action. See infra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
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Proposed section 544(c) would have permitted the trustee to
assert damages claims, in addition to transfer avoidance claims, on
behalf of creditors.' 23 The proposal recognized that in many cases no
practical difference exists between avoidance claims and damages
claims. In fact, many avoidance claims result in a sum paid to the
trustee rather than a transfer of specific property; the trustee receives
the cash value of the transferred property. 124 Both types of claims are
asserted against third parties on behalf of creditors who also could
have asserted the claim. Both types of claims bring additional assets
into the estate, although there may be some circumstances in which
assertion of a claim for damages on behalf of creditors is more compli-
cated and costly than a claim of avoidance. 125
The Caplin majority pointed out that it is unnecessary for the
trustee to assert claims against third parties because the creditors will
assert those claims themselves. 126 To the extent that creditors suc-
cessfully assert their own claims against third parties, the creditors
themselves reduce their claims against the bankruptcy estate. This
allows more assets to be available for other creditors of the estate. 127
There are, however, reasons why relying on creditors to assert their
claims would not maximize the bankruptcy estate's assets. First, the
creditors may initially look to recover from the bankruptcy estate
before proceeding against the third party, or will recover from the
bankruptcy estate before their action against the third party is finally
decided. For example, assume that one group of creditors (Group A)
have fraud claims aggregating $500,000 and have a viable cause of
action against a third party that is jointly liable with the debtor.
Assume also that another group of creditors (Group B) exists with
claims of $100,000. This group does not have a cause of action
against the third party. The debtor's assets total $50,000. Finally,
assume that only some members of Group A have sued the third
party, and that by the time the bankruptcy estate is resolved, not all
members of Group A have settled their claims against the third party.
The third party will be liable to them to the extent that they have been
unable to recover their losses from the bankruptcy estate. If Group A
123. See supra note 65.
124. Bankruptcy Code § 550 provides that the court may award the trustee the property's
value rather than the property itself. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
125. See infra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
127. Certainly, creditors will assert significant claims against third parties who are more
solvent than the debtor. For example, in Ashland Oil v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1989),
individual creditors were permitted to assert civil RICO claims against a third party arising
out of the unlawful movement of assets from the corporate debtor and failure to disclose those
assets to the bankruptcy court.
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had settled with the third party for the full $500,000, the debtor's
assets would satisfy Group B to the extent of fifty cents on the dollar.
If the creditors holding the fraud claim do not settle with the third
party, the $50,000 in assets must be used to satisfy $600,000 worth of
claims held by members of both Group A and Group B. After the
bankruptcy proceeding is over, members of Group A would be left to
proceed against the third party for the deficiency.
A second reason why leaving the creditors to assert their claims
against third parties will not necessarily lead to asset maximization is
that the bankruptcy trustee cannot monitor the progress of the indi-
vidual creditors' actions against the third party. The trustee cannot
predict recovery from the third party. Nor can the trustee deny credi-
tors holding possible claims against third parties because of the possi-
bility that some amount might eventually be recovered from a third
party. 28 As the dissenting justices in Caplin indicated, the only way
for the bankruptcy trustee to know the extent of a third party's liabil-
ity and to know the extent to which a third party can satisfy creditors'
claims is to assert the claim on behalf of the creditors.1 29 Any asset
maximization resulting from the action of individual creditors against
third parties will be fortuitous.13 0
Perhaps the most significant argument against permitting the
trustee to assert damages claims against third parties is that the third
party would simply claim indemnity or contribution from the
estate.13 ' There would be little or no net gain for the estate because
one group of creditors would simply be replaced by the third party.
The drafters of proposed section 544(c) responded to this concern by
denying the trustee the power to assert claims on behalf of creditors if
assertion of the claim was expected to result in "an allowable claim in
favor of [the third party] against the estate."'' 32 Therefore, under pro-
posed section 544(c), the only claims the trustee could assert were
those that in the judgment of the trustee would result in a net gain for
the creditors.
Although an action against a third party occasionally results in a
128. The grounds for denial of a claim are set forth in Bankruptcy Code § 502. 11 U.S.C.
§ 502 (1988). None of the provisions in section 502 provide that a claim can be denied because
of a third party's joint liability.
129. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Under the doctrine of equitable
contribution, joint wrongdoers each much pay pro-rata damages resulting from the wrong. W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 340 (5th ed.
1984). Under the doctrine of indemnification, the entire cost of wrongdoing shifts to another
party. Id. § 51.
132. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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claim by the third party against the estate for an equal amount, in
many cases the third party's conduct is so inequitable that its claim is
denied or subordinated. 33 A claim can be denied if it has no basis in
law or is nonexistent. 34 A claim also may be denied if a creditor has
acted wrongly towards the debtor in such a way that allows the
debtor a defense to the third party's claim.13- Where the third party's
misconduct is directed towards the debtor's creditors, the court will
not necessarily disallow the third party's claim, but may instead
subordinate it to other creditor's claims. 3 6 The effect of subordina-
tion is similar to denial of a claim if there are insufficient assets avail-
able to pay the superior claims.
Equitable subordination of claims occurs where the claimant
engages in inequitable conduct that confers an unfair advantage on
the claimant or injures other creditors and subordination is not incon-
sistent with any other provision of the Bankruptcy Code.3 7 While
many different types of conduct may lead to equitable subordination,
courts pay careful attention to cases in which a corporate insider
asserts a claim against the bankrupt corporation. If the insider has
misused the corporate form for improper advantage, perhaps by fail-
ing to provide the corporation with proper capital, the court may
subordinate the insider's claim. 131
133. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. If a third party who is liable with the
debtor pays the creditors the amount owed after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the third
party may have a claim against the bankruptcy estate for indemnity or contribution. 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(e)(2) (1988). If the third party wishes, it can subrogate its rights to those of the creditors
it paid instead of asserting its own independent claim for indemnity or contribution. 11U.S.C.
§ 509 (1988). In both cases, however, the third party's claim may be subject to subordination
under section 510. 11 U.S.C. § 509(b)(1)(C) (1988). Until the third party's liability to the
creditors is fixed, however, the bankruptcy trustee can deny the third party's claim for
indemnity or contribution. 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(l)(B) (1988); see also In re Provincetown-
Boston Airlines, Inc., 72 B.R. 307 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987) (underwriters' claims for
indemnity arising out of securities fraud claims were contingent and properly denied under
502(e)(l)(B)); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 502.05, 509.02-.03 (1991) (Lawrence P. King
ed., 15th ed. 1991). At least one commentator has criticized the power of the bankruptcy
trustee to deny these claims because it unfairly denies claim holders of the right to participate
in the bankruptcy process simply to expedite the estate's distribution. See Donald E.
Korobkin, "Killing The Husband": Disallowing Contingent Claims for Contribution or
Indemnity in Bankruptcy, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 735 (1990).
134. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 133, $ 510.02.
135. Id.
136. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988) (providing that under principles of equitable
subordination, the bankruptcy court may subordinate all or part of an allowed claim to all or
part of another allowed interest); Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692
(5th Cir. 1977); Malissa K. Stull, Annotation, Bankruptcy: Equitable Subordination, Under 11
USCS § 510(c)(1), of Federal Tax Claims, 102 A.L.R. FED. 867 (1991).
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988); Benjamin, 563 F.2d 692; Stull, supra note 136.
138. In Machinery Rental v. Herpel (In re Multiponics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980),
the court subordinated a corporate director and sole shareholder's claim against the
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In Caplin, Justice Douglas would have denied or subordinated
Marine Midland's subrogation claim because the success of the bank-
ruptcy trustee's action depended on a showing of Marine Midland's
bad faith.1 39 Similarly, if creditors have an alter ego cause of action
against a controlling shareholder of a debtor corporation because of
that shareholder's inequitable conduct, the shareholder would not
have an allowable claim against the bankruptcy estate resulting from
those creditors' claims. In these cases, an action brought by the bank-
ruptcy trustee against the third party will serve to maximize assets
available to pay creditors. To deny the bankruptcy trustee the ability
to assert claims on behalf of creditors against third parties in all cases
because the third parties will sometimes have a claim against the
bankruptcy estate Seems inconsistent with the policy favoring max-
imization of assets available to pay creditors.
Courts may achieve the same policy objective of asset maximiza-
tion by permitting the creditors themselves to decide whether the
trustee can assert the claim. The Bankruptcy Code could allow the
trustee to assert claims against third parties that the creditors volunta-
rily assign if the trustee deems that assertion of the claim is in the best
interest of the estate. The trustee could then assert the claims on
behalf of the assigning creditors, and to the extent the trustee recovers
funds, the assigning creditors' claims against the estate would corre-
spondingly deminish. 14
A rule permitting voluntary assignment of claims would elimi-
nate squabbling between creditors and the trustee over which party is
entitled to assert the claim. Such a rule probably favors creditors with
claims against third parties because they may decide whether to assert
the claim themselves or assign it to the trustee. Allowing the individ-
ual creditors to assign their claims to the trustee, however, would
leave estate asset maximization to happenstance; some creditors may
not assign their claims to the trustee, opting to assert the claim them-
corporation to claims of other creditors because the corporation was undercapitalized. The
director and sole shareholder's claim arose from guarantees given by the director and
shareholder of the bankrupt corporation's debt. The court believed that the
undercapitalization was a cause of the corporation's failure and that the payments on the
guarantees made by the director and sole shareholder were actually belated contributions to
the corporation's capital. The undercapitalization was inequitable and harmed the
corporation's creditors. See also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (subordinating the
dominant stockholder's claim because of fraudulent activity designed to harm the debtor
corporation's shareholders); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 133, 510.05[4].
139. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 430 (1972).
140. At least one court has held that the trustee's powers do not include the ability to assert
claims for damages against third parties, even if the creditors assign their claims to the trustee.
See Williams v. California First Bank, 859 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1988).
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selves. 41 Other creditors may wait for recovery from the estate and
then proceed for any deficiency against the third party. 42 Unless all
creditors with claims against third parties assign their claims to the
trustee, fewer assets will be available for all creditors. 143 In addition,
a voluntary assignment rule is not as desirable as a rule giving the
trustee authority to assert claims without assignment in two other
aspects: voluntary assignments do not lead to equitable. sharing of
assets among creditors,'" and are not as effective in preventing multi-
ple litigation and its costs because the trustee would assert some
claims and individual creditors would assert others.' 45
Another way to maximize assets is to require that creditors with
claims assertable against both the estate and a third party first pursue
the claim against the third party. Such a rule is similar to the equita-
ble doctrine of marshaling assets and makes additional assets of the
debtor available to pay creditors who do not have claims against third
parties.'4 6 For example, if a creditor or group of creditors has a claim
141. The Caplin majority suggested that the aggrieved creditors could reduce the amount of
their claims against the estate by pursuing the liable third parties. 406 U.S. at 431-34. This
leaves property available to satisfy other creditors. For example, if the disappointed investors
in the introductory hypothetical all successfully asserted their claims against the bank, this
reduces claims against the debtor. The estate would then pay the creditors with the remaining
debtor's assets. The problem with this approach is that the trustee cannot force the creditors
to sue the third party, and cannot easily monitor the progress of individual suits by creditors
against the third party. Some creditors may be unaware of a possible action against a third
party, and may simply file a claim in bankruptcy. Others may not find it worthwhile to sue a
third party, and will pursue the easier, albeit possibly less lucrative, course of filing a
bankruptcy claim. Relying on the individual creditors to assert their claims against the third
party will not necessarily maximize the assets available to pay all of the debtor's creditors in
bankruptcy.
Justice Douglas noted the additional possibility that the individual bondholders could
form a committee to proceed against the indenture trustee, accomplishing the same result as if
the bankruptcy trustee had asserted the claim. He noted, however, that such concerted
assertion of a claim should not be left to "happenstance." Id. at 439.
142. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
143. Assume that a debtor has four creditors, each with a claim of $1,000. Assume that the
debtor's assets are only $1,000. Assume that two out of the four creditors' claim against the
debtor arose out of a fraudulent sale of securities by the debtor in which a promoter of the
debtor is also liable. If the bankruptcy trustee may assert the claim against the promoter and
does so successfully, two of the four creditors claims will be satisfied. The other two creditors
will receive $500. If the trustee may not assert the claim, the four creditors will receive only
$250 from the estate, and the two creditors with claims may proceed against the promoter for
the deficiency.
144. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
146. Under the doctrine of marshaling assets, if one creditor is entitled to resort to all funds
for satisfaction of its claim, and a second creditor is entitled to resort to some, but not all, of
those funds, the first creditor is first required to satisfy its claim using those funds to which the
second creditor has no claim. The marshaling doctrine does not apply if it will impair the
right of the first creditor to complete satisfaction or harm third parties. For a discussion of the
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against the bankruptcy estate that is also assertable against the con-
trolling shareholder of the debtor on an alter ego theory, the credi-
tor(s) could be required to assert the alter ego claim before asserting
their claim against the limited assets of the debtor corporation.
The problem with such a rule is that it would prejudice creditors
with claims against third parties by forcing them to assert claims that
might have questionable merit before asserting a claim against the
estate. If the claim lacks merit, the creditors will have expended sig-
nificant time and money in pursuing it. Further, administration of the
estate stalls while creditors assert their claims against the third par-
ties; ultimate distribution of assets could not be determined until
those claims are resolved. Assertion of the individual claims can also
be more costly because each creditor would bring its own suit rather
than a unified action brought by the trustee. In many of these cases, it
is simply more efficient to have the bankruptcy trustee assert the
claim, and such actions can bring substantial additional assets into the
bankruptcy estate.
C. Equitable Distribution of Debtors' Assets
This Part examines whether permitting the trustee to assert dam-
ages claims on behalf of creditors against third parties would lead to a
more equitable distribution of the debtor's assets and a greater recov-
ery of creditors' claims. As noted, pro-rata distribution of assets
among creditors within the same priority class is one of the funda-
mental tenets of bankruptcy. This practice is based on the common-
sense notion that similarly situated creditors should be treated simi-
larly.'47 Thus, one creditor will not bear the entire loss resulting from
the debtor's insolvency while others are paid in full.
1. THE TRUSTEE'S POWERS
Since colonial times, state and federal insolvency laws have
reflected the policy of spreading the risk of loss from insolvency
use of marshaling in bankruptcy proceedings, see Moses Lachman, Note, Marshaling Assets in
Bankruptcy: Recent Innovations in the Doctrine, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 671 (1985).
147. See Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1940); Morris G.
Shanker, The Abuse and Use of Federal Bankruptcy Power, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 3, 28
(1975); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 775, 791 (1987).
Professor Baird notes that there are other ways to distribute the debtor's assets, such as
dividing the amount available by the number of creditors. The impact of this type of
distribution would be to favor smaller lenders, which would encourage creditors to extend only
small amounts of credit. The debtor would then have many creditors instead of a few. Under
another type of repayment system, creditors would have to spend time trying to position
themselves favorably with respect to other creditors. See Douglas G. Baird, Avoiding Powers
Under the Bankruptcy Code, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONF. ON BANKR. 305, 307-08 (1988).
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among creditors generally in order to prevent the collapse of any one
creditor, which could in turn lead to more widespread failures. 4 ' As
a simple example, assume that a debtor owes $1,000 to each of ten
similarly situated creditors, but has only $5,000 in assets. Without
bankruptcy, five of the creditors might be able to recover in full, leav-
ing the other creditors unpaid. This result may be disastrous to the
five unpaid creditors, who in turn might now have to file for bank-
ruptcy. Under bankruptcy policy, the debtor's assets are distributed
pro-rata so that each creditor recovers $500, or fifty cents on the dol-
lar. 149 Because a pro-rata recovery may still be disastrous to the cred-
itors who need to recover more than a pro-rata share in order to
remain solvent, it is hard to determine whether the spreading of the
risk of a debtor's insolvency is beneficial to creditors as a whole. It is
difficult, however, to imagine another system of distribution that
would be more efficient or equitable.5 0
The bankruptcy trustee's power to avoid preferential transfers
leads to a more even distribution of assets among creditors. Outside
of bankruptcy, a debtor generally may prefer one creditor over
another.' 5 ' But if the debtor makes payments to creditors for antece-
dent debts within certain specified periods of the commencement of
the bankruptcy proceeding, the payments may be recovered by the
bankruptcy trustee.'52 Without this preference power, favored credi-
tors would retain the funds paid by the debtor before bankruptcy and
there would be less to distribute in the bankruptcy proceeding. Yet it
is uncertain whether the preference power is effective because credi-
tors may still seize assets if they think that they can get away with it;
the worst that will happen is that they will be required to hand the
assets over to the trustee.
Further, it is difficult to tell exactly when a debtor will file for
bankruptcy and thus whether the debtor's transfer of assets is prefer-
ential. "'53 Nevertheless, in some cases the preference power provides
148. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 12-13 (1974).
149. See II U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988). In this hypothetical, each of the creditors is owed the
same amount of money, so each receives the same amount in bankruptcy. If one creditor was
owed $1,500 and another was owed $750, the one owed $1,500 would receive $750 while the
one owed $750 would receive $375.
150. See Baird, supra note 147, at 307-08.
151. For example, California Civil Code § 3432 provides that a "debtor may pay one
creditor in preference to another, or may give to one creditor security for the payment of his
demand in preference to another." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3432 (West 1970).
152. See supra note 96.
153. Some studies indicate that the power to avoid preferences is fairly ineffective anyway
because many estates have few, if any, assets available for distribution. It may also be the case
that debtors can more efficiently distribute assets among creditors than the bankruptcy system.
See Bowers, supra note 1.
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incentives for creditors to work with the debtor rather than force the
debtor into premature bankruptcy; if there is substantial certainty
that seizure of assets will be preferential, it may be better to let the
debtor keep the assets and try to work out an arrangement in which
creditors will be paid off over a period of time.' 54 Perhaps more
important, the preference power subjects more of the debtor's assets
to the bankruptcy pro rata system of distribution and thus results in a
more even distribution of those assets among creditors.
Permitting the trustee to assert claims on behalf of creditors
rather than leaving it up to the individual creditors to assert their own
claims would tend to equalize recovery among creditors and lead to
the spreading of risk. Returning once again to the alter ego cases,
assume that creditors have claims they can assert against a debtor
corporation and the debtor corporation's controlling shareholder.
Remaining assets of the corporation are insignificant. The debtor
owes each creditor a different amount of money. Assume that the
alter ego claim is not property of the bankruptcy estate, and that the
bankruptcy trustee is barred from asserting the claim under Caplin.
The creditors owed the larger amounts are likely to have a more
sophisticated knowledge of debtor/creditor law and corporation law
and can easily proceed against the controlling shareholder. Accord-
ingly, these larger creditors are more likely to settle with the control-
ling shareholder. Thus, by the time that the smaller creditors assert
their actions against the shareholder, the shareholder is more likely to
be insolvent. Under this scenario, the larger creditors will receive a
much larger recovery while the smaller creditors will be forced to
look to the meager assets of the corporation's bankruptcy estate and
perhaps the shareholder's individual bankruptcy estate. 5' A similar
result arises if the only claims that could be asserted by the bank-
ruptcy trustee were those voluntarily assigned by creditors; those
creditors not assigning their rights might be able to strike a settlement
allowing them a greater share of assets. A more equitable result
occurs if the trustee of the corporation's bankruptcy estate is permit-
ted to assert the alter ego actions on behalf of all the creditors.
154. In the context of Dean Jackson's fishing hypothetical, the preference avoidance rules
permit people to continue fishing a little bit longer and, hopefully, catch more fish overall. See
supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
155. If the settlements with the larger creditors occur within the preference period of the
shareholder's filing of the bankruptcy petition, the smaller creditors may be able to force the
larger creditors to disgorge their settlements. However, since the normal preference period is
90 days, the larger creditors may have been paid outside the preference period and the smaller
creditors may have no recourse. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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2. DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROCEEDS
Who should share in the proceeds of the trustee's successful
claim against a third party if not all creditors could assert the claim
outside of bankruptcy? Consider the fraud hypothetical, discussed in
the introduction, in which not all of the creditors could assert the
fraud cause of action against the bank. Proposed section 544(c) pro-
vided that anything recovered by the trustee under that section would
be distributed only to those creditors who could have asserted the
claim outside of bankruptcy. 15 6 Arguably, the proposed distribution
rule is contrary to bankruptcy policy; certainly, it is contrary to the
distribution of proceeds from other actions by the trustee, in which all
creditors may share in the proceeds based on their bankruptcy prior-
ity.' 57 Was the proposed distribution rule under section 544(c) appro-
priate, or would it have led to an inequitable sharing of assets among
only select creditors?
The rule for the distribution of proceeds from trustee avoidance
actions dates back to the frequently criticized case of Moore v. Bay.
158
In that case, the bankruptcy trustee sought to step into the shoes of an
unsecured creditor and, under former section 70(e), avoid a security
interest that was avoidable under then-existing California law. 159
Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes held that the trustee was not
limited to the amount of the claim to which he was subrogated; the
entire security interest could be avoided even though actual creditors
could only partially avoid it outside of bankruptcy. The Court char-
acterized the avoided property interest as being for the benefit of the
entire bankruptcy estate. 16 The proceeds of the avoided security
interest were then shared both by creditors who could have and those
who could not have avoided the security interest outside of bank-
ruptcy. The rule of Moore continues under the current Bankruptcy
156. See supra note 65.
157. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
158. 284 U.S. 4 (1931). For a thorough discussion of the background and criticism of the
case, see Jackson, supra note 98, at 742-50 (suggesting an alternative interpretation of the
case); see also Frank R. Kennedy, The Trustee In Bankruptcy As a Secured Creditor Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1419 (1967) (criticizing the case).
159. Under current law, the trustee cannot use section 544(b) to avoid security interests
because unsecured creditors cannot take priority over unperfected security interests. U.C.C.
§ 9-301(1) (1989).
160. Dean Jackson proposes that the Supreme Court simply intended to overrule the lower
court (the Ninth Circuit) on the issue of whether the entire estate was to benefit from the
avoided transfer. The Court may not have intended to overrule the Ninth Circuit's holding
that the trustee could only avoid the transfer to the same extent as the actual creditors whose
avoidance claim the trustee was asserting. Dean Jackson notes that the "virtually universal"
reading of Moore is that the trustee could avoid the transfer entirely and that the money




Assume that the bankruptcy trustee could assert the hypothetical
fraud claim and that the Moore rule applies to the distribution of the
proceeds. Under the distributional rule of Moore, creditors other than
the defrauded investors can share in the proceeds of the fraud claim
along with the investors. Arguably, the creditors other than the
investors receive a windfall from the bankruptcy process because they
are able to assert a right to proceeds in bankruptcy that they could
not reach outside of bankruptcy. Certainly, the defrauded investors
are worse off in bankruptcy because they must share the proceeds of
their claim with creditors who were not defrauded.'62 This windfall
effect may encourage inefficient use of the bankruptcy process163
because the creditors who gain from the windfall may prefer to force
the debtor into bankruptcy rather than attempt to work with the
debtor outside of bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy law operates together with non-bankruptcy debtor
and creditor rules in determining the relationships of creditors inter se
and the relationship of creditors to debtors. I" In collecting a debt, a
creditor can attempt to enforce the obligation in the appropriate state
court. In some situations, the creditor may be able to force the debtor
into bankruptcy and resort to the collection procedures utilized in
bankruptcy court. 165 To a great extent, bankruptcy law defers to non-
bankruptcy debt-collection law in determining whether a creditor has
an enforceable claim against the debtor and the extent to which some
161. See 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1988). At the time Congress was considering the Bankruptcy
Code, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States recommended overruling
Moore. The Commission was opposed by the National Bankruptcy Conference, which
asserted through Professor Countryman that the avoiding powers should be exercised for the
benefit of all creditors, not simply for those few who might have been able to assert a claim
outside of bankruptcy. The views of the National Bankruptcy Conference ultimately
prevailed. See Jackson, supra note 95, at 748-49.
162. Assume that 25 creditors hold the securities fraud claim against the third party and
that the aggregate amount of the claim is $50,000. Assume also that 30 other creditors (e.g.,
suppliers) hold claims against the estate, and that outside of bankruptcy these creditors would
not be able to assert the securities fraud claim. All of the creditors are classified as general
unsecured creditors and are not entitled to any priority. Under Moore, if the trustee asserts the
$50,000 claim and recovers, the proceeds will be distributed on a pro rata basis both to the 25
creditors who could have asserted the claim outside of bankruptcy and to the 30 who could
not.
163. See Jackson, supra note 98, at 749-50.
164. See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 955-
59 (1982); see also Countryman, supra note 114; Shanker, supra note 147.
165. A debtor may effectively be forced into bankruptcy if creditors refuse to extend
additional credit necessary for the running of a business or if creditors aggressively begin to
collect outstanding indebtedness. In some cases, creditors may force a debtor into bankruptcy
through the filing of an involuntary petition. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
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creditors have priority over other creditors. 66
If bankruptcy law alters these relationships, there will be incen-
tives for parties to attempt to have disputes resolved where the rules
are more favorable to them. 67 This could result in an inefficient use
of the bankruptcy forum in cases that would be more efficiently han-
dled outside of bankruptcy. Recognizing this potential disparity, sev-
eral commentators have argued that bankruptcy distributional rules
should differ from non-bankruptcy rules only if there is a bankruptcy
policy that mandates the difference. 68 Since the Moore distributional
rule does not significantly add to the amount of assets available to
distribute among creditors, it may not be justified.
The Moore distributional rule does have its defenders.' 69 They
argue that the trustee works on behalf of all creditors, not just those
who have claims against third parties. Permitting only some creditors
166. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979); JACKSON, supra note 80, at 20-27.
167. See Baird, supra note 80, at 825-28 (1987); Eisenberg, supra note 164, at 957-59.
168. An example of a defensible difference between non-bankruptcy law and bankruptcy
law is the rule regarding preferences. Debtors are allowed to prefer one creditor over another
outside of bankruptcy, but are not allowed to make such preferential payments in the time
immediately preceding the bankruptcy proceeding. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3432 (West
1970) (expressly permitting preferential payments outside of bankruptcy) with 11 U.S.C. § 547
(1988) (permitting the bankruptcy trustee to avoid preferential payments). This difference
between bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law is defensible because permitting preferences
before bankruptcy would encourage a race among creditors once insolvency was detected,
leaving little for the bankruptcy estate. See Charles Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy
Act, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292 (1967); JACKSON, supra note 80, at 124 (deeming preference law
"part and parcel of the substitution of collective remedies for individual remedies"); Eisenberg,
supra note 164, at 963.
One area in which bankruptcy law's difference from non-bankruptcy law has been
criticized is in the treatment of security interests in after-acquired collateral (i.e., collateral
acquired by the debtor after the initial grant of the security interest). See, e.g., Eisenberg,
supra note 164, at 958-71. Secured parties generally may obtain security interests in after-
acquired collateral, while under bankruptcy law the trustee may avoid security interests in
some after-acquired collateral that is acquired during the preference period because the
transfer of the security interest is deemed to occur at the time the collateral is acquired. See
U.C.C. § 9-204 (1989); see also 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5), (e)(3) (1988) (special rules for accounts
receivable and inventory). The different bankruptcy treatment has been criticized because it is
not justified by the policy supporting preference avoidance generally-deterring creditors from
grabbing assets shortly before the bankruptcy filing. The act of obtaining a security interest in
after-acquired property (i.e., the execution of the security agreement) is likely to have occurred
before the preference period. See Eisenberg, supra note 164, at 963-71. As a result of this
different treatment, secured lenders with after-acquired property clauses have an increased
aversion to the debtor's possible commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding, while unsecured
creditors may have an increased desire for such a proceeding. Id. at 958. But see Steven L.
Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REV.
327, 333-38 (1982) (arguing, among other things, that the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of
security interests in after-acquired property was designed to prevent secured parties from
manipulating the debtor to improve their position prior to the filing of bankruptcy, a policy
that generally supports the power to avoid preferences).
169. See Hearings, supra note 114, at 4, 7.
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to share in the proceeds from the trustee's claim contradicts normally
applicable distributional rules when the trustee avoids fraudulent
transfers and preferences, which allow creditors who first extended
credit after the preference or fraudulent transfer to share in the pro-
ceeds of the avoidance with creditors who extended credit before-
hand. 170 To permit only those creditors who have claims against
third parties to share in the proceeds would effectively make the
trustee the private attorney for those creditors.' 7'
A rule permitting all creditors to share in proceeds of the
trustee's action is also easier to administer.' 72 The trustee does not
have to distinguish which creditors could have asserted a claim
outside of bankruptcy. For example, in a case of fraud it may be diffi-
cult to determine exactly how many creditors were defrauded.
It may be inequitable, however, to require creditors who were
wronged by a third party to share the proceeds of their bankruptcy
claims with creditors who could not assert the claim outside of bank-
ruptcy. The bankruptcy policy favoring equitable treatment of all
creditors does not mean that all creditors have the same priority. For
example, claims by employees for wages have priority over general
unsecured claims. 73 In addition, secured creditors may retain their
security interests, making it much more likely that they will be paid in
full. 174
The Moore distributional rule should not be extended to further
alter non-bankruptcy allocations of proceeds. A creditor who has
been defrauded by one of the principal shareholders of the debtor cor-
poration should not have to share proceeds of its claim with a creditor
who was never misled and simply took a credit risk that the debtor
would be able to pay debts when due. Likewise, a creditor who
extended credit to the debtor based on the personal guarantee of a
third party should not have to share recovery from that third party
170. See Schwartz, Moore v. Bay - Should Its Rule Be Abolished?, 29 J. NAT'L ASS'N REF.
BANKR. 67 (1955).
171. See Hearings, supra note 114, at 4, 7.
172. Id.
173. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988) (describing priorities); see also Warren, supra note 80, at
786.
174. Some commentators have questioned whether secured parties should be entitled to a
special priority. Others, such as those with personal injury claims, may have a stronger moral
claim that they should be paid first. Rather than reflect a societal consensus of which parties
should be paid first, the bankruptcy priority rules reflect which groups of claimants have
greater political clout. See Philip Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21
UCLA L. REV. 403, 444-49 (1973). The utility of secured lending is also the subject of some
controversy. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Adding Another Piece to the Financing Puzzle: The
Role of Real Property Secured Debt, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 335 (1991).
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with other creditors who extended and priced credit solely on the
basis of the debtor's creditworthiness.
Proposed section 544(c) did not alter the non-bankruptcy relative
entitlements of the creditors."' In addition, if the debtor has some
assets, even those creditors who are not entitled to share in proceeds
of the action against the third party will benefit. For example, if the
trustee had successfully asserted the claim on behalf of the debenture
holders in Caplin, claims against the bankruptcy estate would have
been reduced by more than $4 million, leaving remaining creditors a
larger share of the debtor's $29.4 million in assets. 7 6 Although the
distributional rule of 544(c) differs from that in Moore, permitting the
bankruptcy trustee to assert creditors' claims against third parties is
consistent with the policy of spreading loss equitably among the
debtor's creditors.
D. Economical Estate Administration
As noted, one of the goals of bankruptcy is to provide for efficient
resolution of claims and speedy distribution of available assets.""7
Permitting the trustee to assert damages claims on behalf of creditors
against third parties may not be consistent with that goal. Assertion
of the claim may be costly because the trustee would have to hire
attorneys and gather the information needed to assert the claim, espe-
cially if many creditors are involved with claims based on different
operative facts.'78 Further, the distribution of assets might be delayed
while the trustee asserted the claim, which in some cases might take
several years to resolve.
In some cases, the individual creditors will be in a better position
to assert claims than the trustee. If the claim arises out of a number
of complicated transactions between a third party and several credi-
tors, those creditors will have greater knowledge of the facts underly-
ing the claim and thus may be in a better position to prosecute. In a
complicated securities fraud case in which a third party and a debtor
corporation have conspired to defraud investors, some of the investors
may have claims against the third party while others may not. The
claims may differ-some creditors may have claims based on violation
of federal and state securities laws, while others may have claims
based on common law fraud and negligence.'7 9 The third party's rep-
175. See proposed 11 U.S.C. § 544(c)(3), supra note 65.
176. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
178. See 11 U.S.C. § 327 (1988).
179. The Caplin majority noted that individual debenture holders had filed claims against
Marine Midland based on theories of liability not asserted by the bankruptcy trustee. Caplin v.
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resentations to some of the investors may differ from the ones made to
others. All these factors make it difficult and costly for the bank-
ruptcy trustee to determine the facts giving rise to each of the various
claims.
Assertion of creditors' claims by the bankruptcy trustee will
result in more expenses for the estate. Accordingly, there will be less
funds available to pay the debtor's creditors.18 If the trustee's claim
is successful, however, the proceeds of the claim may exceed the
expense incurred. Proposed section 544(c) provided that expenses
would be paid out of the proceeds of the claim."I Of course, the fees
incurred will sometimes exceed the amount of recovery even if the
claim is successful. Thus, if the bankruptcy trustee may assert dam-
ages claims on behalf of creditors, the trustee may to some extent
gamble with estate assets in the hope of increasing them.
Because of the difficulties and costs of asserting general damages
claims on behalf of creditors, the Bankruptcy Code's distinction
between avoidance and damages claims may make sense. Avoidance
claims are easier to assert than some general claims for damages. 82
The amount of an avoidance claim is probably easier to determine
than the amount of a general claim for damages against third parties
because the avoidance claim is limited to the value of the property
transferred. For example, under the pre-1988 version of U.C.C. Arti-
cle 6, the trustee merely had to show that one creditor entitled to
notice of the bulk transfer was not properly notified, and the bulk
transfer could be avoided in its entirety.18 a The property to be recov-
ered was identifiable and the theory of recovery was clear. In a wide-
spread fraud, however, the amount of damages and the theory of
liability are all more difficult to identify. The costs of asserting such a
complex claim are also likely to be greater.
Alternatively, in circumstances involving a third party's genera-
lized misconduct that affects a large number of creditors, the trustee
may be in the best position to discover the misconduct and assert the
Marine Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 431-32 (1971); see also supra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text.
180. The bankruptcy trustee may employ attorneys to assist in the administration of the
estate. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (1988). The attorneys are entitled to compensation from the estate. 11
U.S.C. § 330 (1988). These types of administrative expenses are entitled to priority in payment
over claims of other creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(2), 507(a)(1) (1988).
181. See supra note 65.
182. See Hearings, supra note 114, at 7-8 ("Under present § 70e as interpreted in Moore, the
trustee need identify only one creditor with a provable claim who could have avoided the
transfer in order to avoid it for the estate.").
183. Id.; see also Hull, supra note 121, at 707.
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claims. 184 For example, if a controlling shareholder has misused the
corporate form to such an extent that creditors of the bankrupt corpo-
ration have an alter ego action against the shareholder, the trustee
may be in the best position to discover the facts giving rise to the
action and to assert the claim against the shareholder. If the claims of
the individual creditors are not sufficient to justify pursuit by any one
creditor, the claim may not be pursued at all except by the trustee. In
such situations, the trustee's pursuit of the claim is similar to a class
action and may result in a net reduction of claims against the estate
which would not result if the claim were left to the individual
creditors. 183
Who should decide whether the trustee is in the best position to
assert a claim? Perhaps those creditors who have claims against the
third party could vote on whether the trustee should assert the claim.
Certainly those creditors are most familiar with the circumstances
surrounding the claim, and they are the ones who will be giving up
the right to assert it. The trustee, however, is in a better position to
determine whether assertion of the claim is in the best interest of the
estate as a whole, which includes both creditors with claims against
third parties and creditors with claims only against the debtor. The
trustee tries to maximize assets available to pay the claims of all credi-
tors, and must decide whether to gamble estate assets by suing third
parties. If the creditors with claims against third parties vote against
the trustee's assertion of the claim, it is possible that assets will not be
maximized for all creditors. 186
Multiple litigation may be avoided by permitting the trustee to
assert the claim. Proposed section 544(c) would have permitted the
trustee to bind the creditors in any litigation against a third party.
187
184. The trustee, through his investigative powers, was able to discover the claim in Caplin,
but his argument that he was in the best position to assert the claim did not persuade the
majority of the Court. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 427-28
(1972). Similar investigative powers exist under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11
U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3) (1988).
185. Class actions are appropriate where a large number of people have been injured by
another person's conduct, when the injury to many of the individuals is not sufficient to justify
the litigation costs. The class action permits the joinder of the injured parties at low cost and
provides for reimbursement to the individuals prosecuting the action to prevent free riders.
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CI. L.
REV. 1 (1991); see also Paul C. Wohlmuth, The Class Action and Bankruptcy: Tracking the
Evolution of a Legal Principle, 21 UCLA L. REV. 577, 598-99 (1973) (arguing that permitting
the trustee to assert these claims is consistent with the principles supporting class actions
generally).
186. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 65.
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The trustee's assertion of claims common to a number of creditors
may result in substantial cost savings, and thus additional funds to
satisfy creditors. For example, assume that ten creditors have an alter
ego claim against the controlling shareholder of a corporate debtor.
Assume that it would cost each creditor $10,000 in attorneys' fees to
prosecute the claim. If the trustee were allowed to assert the claim on
the behalf of creditors, assume that the trustee would incur $20,000 in
fees. In this circumstance there is an aggregate saving of $80,000 in
fees, which provides a greater recovery for the creditors. Although
certain claims may be so complex that it would cost the trustee much
more to assert the claim than it would the individual creditors, in
cases involving claims based on common facts, it would be in the best
interest of creditors to permit the trustee to assert the claim on their
behalf.
To some extent, the bankruptcy trustee's claims against third
parties may lead to delays in the final distribution of assets of the
estate. Until it is determined exactly how much can be recovered
from the third party, the debtor's assets should not be distributed to
the creditors with the claim against the third party and to other credi-
tors. For example, assume that a debtor has assets of $100,000.
There are creditors with claims against both the debtor and a third
party in the amount of $500,000 (Group A). The debtor also has
other creditors with equal priority with claims solely against the
debtor who are also owed $500,000 (Group B). If the trustee decides
to assert Group A's claim against the third party, funds must be
reserved to prosecute the claim; accordingly, the trustee must wait
until the end of the case before the exact amount payable to creditors
can be determined.
This problem, however, already exists to some extent, because
the trustee is empowered to assert claims on behalf of the debtor
against third parties. In some cases, it may be possible to distribute
some assets to creditors pending final resolution of the claim. The
Bankruptcy Code is not clear regarding the timing of distribution of
assets. 188 In our hypothetical, creditors in Group A and Group B
would receive approximately ten cents on the dollar if the debtor's
188. "Little, if any, statutory authority covers the nature and mechanisms for distributions
to be made in cash or property, tangible or intangible, under a plan of reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code." COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE 92.02 (Asa
S. Herzog & Lawrence P. King eds., 1991). A plan of reorganization can provide for the
enforcement by the trustee of a claim owned by the estate. I I U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (1988).
The bankruptcy court has broad discretion over the time of distribution of assets in a Chapter
7 liquidation as long as the creditors are paid as promptly as practicable. 11 U.S.C. app. rule
3009 (1988).
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assets are distributed while the trustee asserts the claim against the
third party, taking into account some assets reserved for prosecution
of the claim. If the trustee's claim against the third party is success-
ful, the trustee can distribute the proceeds of the claim among mem-
bers of Group A and B to place the creditors in the positions they
would have held had all the estate's assets been distributed after the
lawsuit's completion. If the trustee recovers all that is owed to mem-
bers of Group A, including attorney's fees, members of Group B
would receive twenty rather than ten cents on the dollar. In this case,
the significant increase in assets available for creditors justifies the
delay in the final distribution.
It cannot fairly be said that in every case administrative difficul-
ties and expense justify denying the bankruptcy trustee the authority
to prosecute creditors' claims against third parties. In some circum-
stances, the trustee can bring substantial assets into the estate while
equitably spreading loss and incurring less expense than would the
creditors themselves if they separately pursued their own actions.
E. The Effectiveness of Proposed Section 544(c) in Properly
Balancing Bankruptcy Policies
The drafters of proposed section 544(c) sought to empower the
trustee to assert claims in order to further the policies of asset max-
imization and equitable distribution. The drafters specifically
declined to empower the trustee to assert a claim if it was likely that
the third party would be able to counter-claim against the estate for
an equivalent amount. Otherwise, the drafters provided little gui-
dance about which claims should be asserted: the claim could be
asserted if it was in the "best interests of the estate." This Part exam-
ines whether the drafters could have provided better guidance to the
trustee as to when claims should be asserted, or whether this is a cir-
cumstance in which an unclear rule best furthers the drafters'
intentions. 189
If we assume that there are some cases in which the bankruptcy
trustee should be empowered to assert claims on behalf of creditors, it
is necessary to examine whether proposed section 544(c) went far
enough in defining such cases. The proposal did suggest that a claim
that would result in an allowable claim asserted by the third party
189. For a discussion of the never-ending conflict between clear rules that compel
predictable decisionmaking and more flexible rules that provide less predictable (but perhaps




against the estate would not be in the best interest of the estate.' 90
The proposal did not permit the trustee to assert claims in those cases
even if the third party's claim would be equitably subordinated to the
claims of others because of the third party's wrongdoing. 191 In those
cases, assertion of the claim arguably benefits the vast majority of par-
ticipants in the estate and the claim of the third party would properly
result in little recovery, if any.
Consider, for example, the claim of the debenture holders in Cap-
lin v. Marine Midland. If the trustee was permitted to sue the inden-
ture trustee Marine Midland on behalf of the debenture holders and
succeeded in showing that the indenture trustee had acted in bad faith
in failing to monitor the debtor's conduct, Marine Midland's inequita-
ble behavior might have caused the bankruptcy court either to deny
or subordinate its claim. 192 Bad faith failure to make certain that the
debtor had lived up to its commitment not to incur excessive indebt-
edness arguably harmed the company to the detriment of all creditors.
If the court allowed Marine Midland's claim against the estate but
subordinated it to the claims of other unsecured creditors, those credi-
tors would still benefit from the trustee's assertion of the claim. Even
though the estate would not obtain a net benefit from the trustee's
actions because technically Marine Midland would have a claim in
equal amount to the claim of the debenture holders, it still may make
sense for the trustee to sue because the "innocent" creditors would
receive larger payments from the estate.1
93
The proposed statute did not make clear whether assertion of a
claim might not be in the best interests of the estate because of admin-
190. See proposed 11 U.S.C. § 544(c)(1)(C), supra note 65.
191. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
192. See Caplin v. Marine Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 440 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
193. In determining whether claim assertion is in the best interest of the estate as a whole,
the trustee must consider whether the creditors holding the claim against the third party also
hold claims against the bankruptcy estate that are already subordinated. For example,
subordinated debentures may provide that their holders will be paid only after all other
creditors. In bankruptcy, the holders of subordinated debentures cannot improve their
position to one of general unsecured creditors by attempting to assert securities fraud claims,
because those types of claims are subordinated to claims of general unsecured creditors. See 11
U.S.C. § 510(b) (1988); Kira v. Holiday Mart, Inc., 715 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1983). Asserting
fraud claims on behalf of subordinated debenture holders will not help the position of other
unsecured creditors who already have priority.
By contrast, holders of unsubordinated notes have claims that are on a par with general
unsecured creditors. See In re Blondheim Real Estate, Inc., 91 BR. 639 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1988) (holding that section 510(b) does not require subordination of claims by noteholders for
money due). The trustee may be able to help other unsecured creditors if the trustee can assert
those claims held by noteholders against third parties that reduce the amount owed by the
bankruptcy estate to the noteholders.
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istrative difficulties. As noted, some claims may involve so many dif-
ferent factual scenarios for so many different creditors that it would
be excessively costly for the trustee to assert the claim. Success in
asserting some claims may be problematic either because the third
party has a good defense to the creditors' claims or because the third
party is itself insolvent. If a disputed claim of liability is complex, the
suit will substantially delay the administration of the estate. In other
cases, the cost of pursuing the claim may be great and the chances of
success may be questionable. In those cases, if the trustee unsuccess-
fully asserted the claim, the administrative costs would erode the
assets available to pay creditors and result in a net loss to the estate.
Thus, assertion of the claim would not be in the best interests of the
estate. A statute empowering the bankruptcy trustee to assert claims
should perhaps describe such limitations to the power.
Another question that arises with respect to proposed section
544(c) is whether the trustee should assert claims on behalf of some
creditors if no assets are available for other creditors. For example,
assume that a debtor has no assets to distribute while having four
creditors with claims aggregating $100,000, which are also assertable
against a third party, and other creditors with claims aggregating
$500,000. In such a case, action by the trustee will not benefit the
majority of creditors holding claims; they receive nothing whether the
trustee asserts the claim or not. In this situation, the individual credi-
tors should be allowed to sue the third party outside of bankruptcy.
Alternatively, if a substantial number of creditors hold a claim against
a third party, the bankruptcy policy favoring equitable sharing of loss
might support the bankruptcy trustee's assertion of the claim even
though the debtor has no assets available to pay others with claims
against the estate.
Section 544(c) did not provide much guidance for determining
what is in the "best interests of the estate," nor did it expressly pro-
vide for judicial oversight of the trustee's decision of whether to assert
a claim on behalf of creditors. Perhaps it is best simply to leave the
decision of whether to assert a claim in the sound discretion of the
bankruptcy trustee. The trustee already has broad powers to investi-
gate the affairs of the debtor and to recover the debtor's assets.1 94 In
some cases, however, the court has the power to review actions taken
by the trustee.' 95
194. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106 (1988) (detailing the powers of the bankruptcy trustee in
liquidation and reorganization).
195. For example, the court reviews a decision to abandon property that is of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate. II U.S.C. § 554 (1988).
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With so many factors to consider in determining whether the
trustee is in the best position to assert the claim, it is likely that situa-
tions will arise in which creditors or third parties will disagree with a
trustee's decision that the suit is in the overall best interest of the
estate. The individual creditors should be allowed to go into court
and seek a determination that they, not the trustee, are in a better
position to assert the claims themselves, or at least assist in the suit,
because of their superior knowledge of the facts underlying the claim.
Because the trustee, rather than the individual creditors or the court,
is generally in the best position to determine whether assertion of a
claim would benefit creditors of the estate as a whole, courts should
not overturn the trustee's decision unless it is clearly contrary to stat-
utory authority.
If the Bankruptcy Code is changed to permit the trustee to assert
damages claims on behalf of creditors against third parties, the
trustee's failure to sue should not preclude the individual creditors
from asserting the claim. Some cases have held that the bankruptcy
trustee's failure to assert a claim of avoidance on behalf of creditors
under section 544(b) bars the individual creditors from proceeding
since the claim is property of the bankruptcy estate.196 Although it
makes sense to vest the exclusive right to assert bulk sales and fraudu-
lent transfer claims in the trustee because such claims belong in bank-
ruptcy to all creditors of the estate, damages claims against third
parties may not belong to all creditors, and it may not make sense for
the trustee to assert such claims. Proposed section 544(c), which pro-
vided that the court could stay actions brought by individual creditors
if the trustee decided to assert the claim, should have explicitly pro-
vided that the trustee's failure to assert damages claims against third
parties does not preclude the individual creditors from asserting them.
Any proposal requiring a balance of the various factors support-
ing or opposing the assertion of a claim can be criticized as a murky
rule requiring analysis on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a rule would
bring uncertainty and expense to bankruptcy administration, because
creditors, trustees, and third parties may dispute whether the claim is
one which should be asserted by the trustee. A more certain rule,
however, such as one prohibiting the trustee from asserting claims on
behalf of creditors, gives too much weight to some policies and no
weight to others. Are the costs incurred in litigating the issue of the
196. See In re Mortgage America Corp., 714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that
fraudulent transfer action was property of the bankruptcy estate and could only be asserted by
bankruptcy trustee); In re Munoz, 111 B.R. 928 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (holding that
fraudulent transfer action was property of the estate and could not be asserted by creditor after
debtor's discharge).
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trustee's standing to assert claims under an uncertain rule outweighed
by the benefits of the trustee's additional assertion of claims? As it is,
under the more "certain" rule provided by Caplin, litigation still
occurs over the trustee's standing to assert claims, because questions
arise under state law over whether a claim belongs to the debtor or to
the creditors.'97 It is probably worthwhile to experiment with a more
flexible rule and see if it is administratively operable. Only a discre-
tionary rule with operative guidelines provides hope that competing
policies will be balanced in a given case.
In sum, Congress was on the right track when it considered giv-
ing the trustee authority to sue third parties on behalf of creditors,
although there should have been more guidance about what consti-
tutes "the best interests of the estate." The proposal should have indi-
cated that it may be in the best interests of the estate to sue if any
possible claim by the third party against the estate would be
subordinated to claims of the other creditors. In addition, the statute
should have indicated that some cases may be so complex that they.
must be left to individual creditors to pursue. The trustee should not
assert claims unless other creditors besides those holding claims will
benefit or a large number of the estate's creditors will share in the
proceeds. There should be some judicial oversight so that interested
parties can participate in the decision of whether the trustee should
assert a claim. 198
197. See supra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
198. A better version of a section 544(c) might read as follows (additions are italicized):
(c)(1) The trustee may enforce any cause of action that a creditor, a class of
creditors, an equity security holder, or a class of equity security holders has
against any person, if-
(A) the trustee could not recover against such person on such cause of
action other than under this subsection;
(B) recovery by the trustee for the benefit of such creditor or equity
security holder or the members of such class will reduce the claim or
interest of such creditor or equity security holder or of such members, as
the case may be, against or in the estate;
(C) there is a reasonable likelihood that recovery against such person will
not create an allowable claim in favor of such person against the estate
that is not reasonably likely to be subordinated to the claim of all or part of
another allowed claim; and
(D) enforcement of such cause of action is in the best interest of the
estate. In determining whether enforcement of such cause of action is in the
best interest of the estate, the following factors shall be considered-
(i) whether it is probable that enforcement of the claim will be
successful;
(ii) whether it is probable that the administrative expense in asserting
the claim will be exceeded by the recovery;
(iii) whether the facts and theories of liability underlying the claim are
sufficiently common to all creditors and equity security holders who are
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To illustrate how current law works and to compare how results
might differ under a statute approximating section 544(c), Part IV
considers the trustee's standing to assert bulk sales claims under the
revised Article 6 of the U.C.C. This analysis is relevant because the
drafters of the new Article 6 sought to deprive the trustee of the abil-
ity to assert such claims on behalf of injured creditors. The following
analysis examines whether the drafters were successful in limiting the
trustee's ability to assert bulk sales claims under current law and
whether assertion of bulk sales claims would be in the best interest of
the bankruptcy estate.
IV. PROPOSED SECTION 544(C) AND THE TRUSTEE'S ASSERTION
OF BULK SALES CLAIMS ARISING UNDER NEW
ARTICLE 6 OF THE UCC
The uniform law governing bulk transfers, located in Article 6 of
the U.C.C., has recently been revised.' 99 The new law, with several
exceptions, applies if an entity that is in the business of selling goods
from stock sells over 50% of its inventory to a buyer who knows or
should know that the seller is going out of business.2o If Article 6
applies to a transaction, the buyer must notify the seller's creditors
entitled to assert the claim outside of bankruptcy, such that the trustee is in
as good a position to assert the claim as are those creditors and equity
security holders; and
(iv) whether assertion of the claim will benefit all or substantially all
creditors and equity security holders.
(2) If the trustee brings an action on such cause of action-
(A) the clerk shall give notice to all creditors or equity security holders
that could have brought an action on such cause of action if the trustee
had not done so;
(B) upon objection of any party with an allowed claim or interest or of the
party against whom the cause of action is asserted, and after notice and a
hearing, the court may order the trustee not to proceed with the action if the
court determines that the cause of action is not properly enforceable by the
trustee under paragraph (1) of this subsection; and
(C) the court, after notice and a hearing, may stay the commencement or
continuation of any other action on such cause of action.
(3) A judgment in any such action brought by the trustee binds all creditors or
equity security holders that could have brought an action on such cause of
action. Any recovery by the trustee, less any expense incurred by the trustee in
effecting such recovery, shall be for the benefit only of such creditors or equity
security holders. If the trustee does not assert a cause of action subject to the
provisions of this subsection, any creditors or equity security holders who are
entitled to bring the action outside of bankruptcy are free to do so.
See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 416-17 (1977).
199. U.C.C. art. 6, alternative B (1989). Alternative A recommends repeal of Article 6. See
Fred H. Miller, The Scope of Uniform Commercial Code Article 6: A Tale of Two Proposals, 41
ALA. L. REV. 587 (1990).
200. U.C.C. § 6-102(c) (1989). The exceptions are located in U.C.C. 6-103 (1989). Among
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either directly or through filing notice before the closing of the trans-
action.20 1 The statute is intended to inform creditors if a debtor-seller
is liquidating inventory so that they can protect themselves, perhaps
by initiating judicial proceedings against the seller.2"2 Failure to give
notice may result in the buyer's liability to the seller's creditors.20 3
Unlike former law, the new Article 6 does not provide that the sale is
ineffective as against the seller's creditors; the remedy under new
Article 6 is a damages claim against the buyer.2 "
As previously noted, under the prior version of Article 6 a non-
complying bulk transfer was voidable by the seller's creditors.20 5 If
the seller went into bankruptcy, the seller's bankruptcy trustee could
step into the shoes of the seller's creditors and avoid the entire sale.2°
Under Moore v. Bay, the trustee could avoid an entire sale on the
strength of a creditor holding an insignificant claim, and the recov-
ered assets would benefit the entire bankruptcy estate.2°" Thus, the
filing of a bankruptcy petition by the transferor could increase the
transferee's liability dramatically. Outside of bankruptcy, only credi-
tors who held claims pre-dating the bulk transfer could avoid the
transfer.208
The new Article 6 seeks to remedy this perceived injustice by
giving aggrieved creditors a personal claim for damages against the
non-complying buyer, rather than the right to avoid the sale in rem.2 °9
The official commentary indicates the drafters' intent to deprive the
bankruptcy trustee of a Moore right to upset an entire non-complying
bulk sale on behalf of creditors holding only insignificant claims.210
the exceptions are sales in which the value of the assets sold exceeds $25,000,000, or the value
of the assets net of liens and security interests is less than $10,000. U.C.C. § 6-103(3)(1) (1989).
201. If the seller has or gives a verified statement to the buyer that it has 200 or more
claimants, excluding claimants holding claims for employment compensation, the buyer may
comply with Article 6 by filing the notice of sale in a central office. U.C.C. § 6-105(2) (1989).
Otherwise, the buyer must give notice by sending the notice of sale to known claimants.
U.C.C. § 6-105(1) (1989).
202. See Hull, supra note 121, at 704-05.
203. See U.C.C. § 6-107 (1989).
204. A buyer's failure to comply with the requirements of Section 6-104(1) does not
(i) impair the buyer's rights in or title to the assets, (ii) render the sale ineffective,
void, or voidable, (iii) entitle a creditor to more than a single satisfaction of his
(or her) claim, or (iv) create liability other than as provided in this Article.
U.C.C. § 6-107(8) (1989).
205. See U.C.C. § 6-105 (1987).
206. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
208. See U.C.C. § 6-109(l) (1987).
209. See U.C.C. § 6-107(1) (1989).
210. The change in the theory of liability [from in rem to in personam] in the
available remedy should be of particular significance if the seller enters
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The question remains whether the trustee retains any power to assert
creditor's claims arising out of a defective bulk sale in the event of the
seller's bankruptcy.
Assuming Caplin is still good law, the trustee could not argue
that the claim belongs to the debtor outside of bankruptcy because the
seller of goods in bulk does not have a claim against the buyer for
failure to comply with Article 6. Thus, the bankruptcy trustee could
not assert the claim under Bankruptcy Code section 541 as property
of the estate.211 Article 6 claims belong to injured creditors,2 12 and
any power that the trustee might have would arise out of the "strong
arm clause" of section 544(a), or under the subrogation clause of sec-
tion 544(b).213
Although the "strong arm clause" gives the trustee the rights
and powers of hypothetical creditors who extend credit at the com-
mencement of the bankruptcy case,21 4 the trustee could not challenge
a non-complying bulk sale under this provision because not all credi-
tors can challenge a defective bulk sale. In fact, Article 6 provides
that only those who were adversely affected by the failure to give
notice may complain.21 5 A creditor who extends credit after the bulk
sale would have difficulty arguing that the creditor's claim would be
less had the buyer complied with Article 6. Presumably, the creditor
based its decision to extend credit on the seller's condition after the
bulk sale had already taken place.2 16 Hence, as a hypothetical credi-
tor extending credit after the defective bulk sale, the bankruptcy
trustee could not claim a loss resulting from the failure to give notice
of the bulk sale.
Historically, the trustee relied on the subrogation provision21 7 to
bankruptcy after the sale is consummated. When an aggrieved creditor of the
transferor has a nonbankruptcy right to avoid a transfer in whole or in part, as
may be the case under Article 6 (1987 Official Text), the transferor's bankruptcy
trustee may avoid the entire transfer. See Bankruptcy Code § 544(b), 11 U.S.C.
§ 544(b). Under this Article, a person who is aggrieved by the buyer's
noncompliance may not avoid the sale. Rather, the person is entitled only to
recover damages as provided in this section. Because no creditor has the right to
avoid the transaction or to assert a remedy that is the functional equivalent of
avoidance, the seller's bankruptcy trustee likewise should be unable to do so.
U.C.C. § 6-107, cmt. 2 (1989).
211. See supra notes 3-4, 101-02 and accompanying text.
212. See U.C.C. § 6-107 (1989).
213. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a), (b) (1988).
214. See supra note 75.
215. U.C.C. § 6-107(1) (1989).
216. "This Article makes explicit what is implicit in Article 6 (1987 Official Text): only
those persons as to whom there has been noncompliance are entitled to a remedy." U.C.C.
§ 6-107 cmt. 3 (1989).
217. The subrogation provision is now codified as 11 U.S.C. 544(b) (1988).
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avoid bulk transfers. 218 The new Article 6 clearly seeks to foreclose
the ability of the trustee to step into the shoes of aggrieved creditors
and avoid defective bulk transfers by making liability of non-comply-
ing buyers in bulk personal, rather than allowing avoidance of the
bulk transfer.2"9 Because the trustee only has the power to avoid
transfers that an actual creditor could avoid "under applicable law,"
and "applicable law," namely Article 6, says that no one can "avoid"
a defective bulk transfer,22 the trustee is unable to assert creditors'
claims under any provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, Article
6 defines these claims as personal claims of creditors against the non-
complying buyer which, under Caplin, the bankruptcy trustee cannot
assert.221
A creative trustee might argue, with some difficulty,222 that
because the cause of action arises as the result of an improperly
noticed transfer of the debtor's property, it should be encompassed
within the avoidability of section 544(b).2 23 Since recovery is limited
to the value of the property transferred,224 the remedy is the func-
tional equivalent of avoidance. In fact, the statutory remedy under
revised Article 6 and the practical remedy under former Article 6 are
similar because the trustee or aggrieved creditor normally received the
monetary equivalent of the property transferred rather than the prop-
erty itself.225 If courts focus on the nature of the wrong rather than
the remedy, the trustee may still assert creditors' claims under revised
Article 6, because the nature of the wrong remains the same-failure
to notify the seller's creditors of an impending bulk sale.
In addition, there are limits to a state legislature's ability to alter
the power of a bankruptcy trustee. Whether a cause of action vests in
218. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 210.
220. See U.C.C. § 6-107(8) (1989).
221. See supra notes 20-58 and accompanying text.
222. Courts generally look to the label of the remedy provided by state law in determining
whether a voidable transfer exists. For example, in Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 201 F.2d 635
(2d Cir. 1953), Judge Learned Hand held that the bankruptcy trustee, acting on behalf of the
creditors of the bankruptcy estate, could not recover allegedly improper payments made by the
debtor to a third party, because under state law the payments were not transfers of property
voidable ex proprio vigore ("of its own force"). The payments were voidable only indirectly,
and thus the trustee could not assert the claim. Id. at 639. Since the drafters of new Article 6
have clearly indicated that sales of goods in violation of Article 6 are not voidable directly, the
trustee can only argue that they are indirectly voidable.
223. See State Bar of California, Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of
the State Bar of California on Proposed Revisions to Article 6 Regarding Bulk Sales 1, 9-10
(July 11, 1988) (unpublished report, on file with the author) [hereinafter U.C.C. Committee
Report].
224. See U.C.C. § 6-107(4) (1989).
225. See U.C.C. Committee Report, supra note 223, at 12-13.
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the trustee under section 544 is an issue of federal law. In other set-
tings, conflicts between the U.C.C. and the Bankruptcy Code have
been resolved in favor of federal law. For example, a question existed
for some time whether a security interest in property acquired by the
debtor during the preference period but after execution of the security
agreement was voidable as a preference in bankruptcy. Some credi-
tors argued that such security interests in property acquired by the
debtor in ordinary course were valid because they were "deemed" for
new value under U.C.C. § 9-108.226 Congress ultimately decided the
issue by providing that security interests in after-acquired property
might be preferences to the extent that the secured party improved its
position during the preference period.2 27
Section 544, however, looks to "applicable" non-bankruptcy law
in determining the trustee's power. 228 Therefore, the characterization
of creditor's remedies under Article 6 should determine the extent of
the trustee's remedy inside bankruptcy.229 If it wanted to, a state leg-
islature could repeal Article 6 and not provide a remedy for creditors
in the event of a bulk sale.230 Alternatively, a legislature could take a
less drastic step and alter the available remedy or limit the transferee's
liability. Courts should not permit the bankruptcy trustee to avoid
non-complying bulk sales under section 544 because of the drafters'
226. Section 9-108 provides as follows:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation, releases a
perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value which is to be secured in
whole or in party by after-acquired property his security interest in the after-
acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security
for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral either in
the ordinary course of this business or under a contract of purchase made
pursuant to the.security agreement within a reasonable time after new value is
given.
U.C.C. § 9-108 (1989).
227. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5), (e)(3) (1988).
228. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988).
229. Courts have carefully scrutinized state legislation that has the effect of
modifying rights in bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Cheesenian v. Nachman
(In re Cheeseman), 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981) (a state exemption statute which
prohibits one spouse from claiming an exemption in a joint bankruptcy violates
federal policy); In re Stacey, 24 Bankr. 97 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (holding a
California statute designed to prohibit exemption "stacking" in bankruptcy,
despite prior decisions approving stacking, violated the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution); In re Lee, 22 Bankr. 977 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982)
(same). These cases, however, dealt with statutes having an impact only in
bankruptcy, and, thus, are unlike Revised Article 6, which has significant impact
on creditors outside of bankruptcy.
U.C.C. Committee Report, supra note 223, at 13.
230. The revised Article 6 is Alternative B proposed by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute in 1988. Alternative
A repeals Article 6. See supra note 199.
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specific expression that the remedy of aggrieved creditors under
revised Article 6 is not avoidance.
Would the result be different under a rule approximating pro-
posed section 544(c)? A bulk sale claim successfully asserted on
behalf of non-notified creditors would reduce the claims of those cred-
itors, perhaps freeing additional assets for others. However, success-
ful assertion of the bulk sale claim might not result in a net gain for
the bankruptcy estate because a buyer liable for failing to comply with
Article 6 who pays the seller's creditors has a claim against the
seller.23' For example, if a buyer in bulk fails to notify creditors, as
required by Article 6, and incurs liability to the seller's creditors in
the amount of $10,000, and pays that $10,000, the buyer has a
$10,000 claim against the seller. In the bankruptcy context, the
seller's creditors' claims of $10,000 are simply replaced by the buyer's
claim of $10,000. Under proposed section 544(c), the trustee could
not assert the claim because of the reasonable likelihood that the third
party could assert a claim against the bankruptcy estate.2 32
It may be, however, that the buyer's claim against the bank-
ruptcy estate would be subordinated to claims of other creditors. The
new Article 6 exempts from liability non-complying buyers in bulk
who either mistakenly believe that Article 6 does not cover the trans-
action or who inadvertently fail to properly comply, if such mistake
or failure is in good faith and is commercially reasonable.233 The pos-
sibility exists that the non-complying buyer might act in concert with
the seller to make it even more difficult for the seller's creditors to
secure payment. If the buyer knew it had to notify creditors of the
sale and willfully opted not to do so, a court could subordinate the
buyer's claim for reimbursement to the claims of the harmed credi-
tors.234 If a new statute empowered the trustee to assert claims
against third parties when any corresponding claim by the third party
was likely to be subordinated, the trustee might be able to assert some
bulk sale claims.
The question remains whether assertion of bulk sales claims
would otherwise be in the best interests of the estate. The nature of
the claim itself is not inordinately complex. It should not be difficult
to determine whether the buyer gave the required notice of sale. Any
defense that the buyer might have, such as that it acted with a good
faith belief that the sale was exempt, is likely to apply to all creditors
231. See U.C.C. § 6-107(10) (1989).
232. See proposed I I U.S.C. 544(c)(1)(C), supra note 65.
233. See U.C.C. § 6-107 (1989).
234. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
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or to none.235  The burden is on the non-complying buyer to show
that the creditors would not have recovered even if the buyer had
complied, and the trustee should be able to counter such a defense as
well as any individual creditor.236 It may be that permitting the
trustee to assert the claim is the only practical way of assuring that
the claim will be asserted at all, because the individual creditors may
not have claims large enough to justify pursuing them on an individ-
ual basis. Thus, creditors will save significant expenses in having the
trustee assert the claim on their behalf.237 Permitting the trustee to
assert the claim will also further the policy of treating like creditors
alike through equitable distribution of any proceeds derived from the
bulk transfer claim. 238
Permitting the bankruptcy trustee to assert the bulk sale claim
under new Article 6 would not necessarily contradict the intent of
new Article 6, at least as long as the trustee is limited to asserting the
amount of claims of creditors. Under former law, existence of one
creditor with a $50 claim who was not notified could result in a bank-
ruptcy trustee's avoidance of a $100,000 transaction in its entirety.
The new Article 6 was intended to limit the liability of the buyer to
the amount of harm caused by the failure to comply with Article 6.239
If the trustee's claim was limited to $50 rather than avoidance of the
entire $100,000 sale, it should not make much difference to the buyer
whether the trustee or an injured creditor asserts the claim.
A final point worth noting is that in many cases, a non-comply-
ing bulk sale may also be a fraudulent transfer.2 ° If a buyer acted in
bad faith in failing to comply or acted in a commercially unreasonable
manner, such conduct may be evidence of a sale with the intent to
235. Revised Article 6 provides a number of defenses that a buyer can assert. The buyer
may try to assert that the transaction was exempt from Article 6 under section 6-103. The
buyer may assert that, after inquiry, it did not have notice that the seller was going out of
business, and that the transaction is not a "bulk sale" under section 6-102. The buyer may also
assert that it had a good faith and commercially reasonable belief that the transaction was not
subject to Article 6, or that the buyer made a good faith and commercially reasonable attempt
to comply with the law. See U.C.C. § 6-107(3) (1989).
236. While the creditor has the burden of proving the amount and validity of the claim, the
buyer has the burden of showing the amount that the creditor would not have realized if the
buyer had complied. U.C.C. § 6-107(2) (1989).
237. See U.C.C. Committee Report, supra note 223, at 15.
238. Id.
239. "Unlike Article 6 (1987 Official Text), which imposes strict liability upon a
noncomplying transferee, this Article imposes liability for noncompliance only when the
failure to comply actually has injured a creditor and only to the extent of the injury." U.C.C.
§ 6-107 cmt. 4 (1989).
240. See Peter A. Alces, Fraud Bases ofBulk Transferee Liability, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 679
(1990); Peter A. Alces, The Confluence ofBulk Transfer and Fraudulent Disposition Law, 41
ALA. L. REV. 821 (1990).
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defraud creditors or for less than the fair value of the business. 24' The
bankruptcy trustee can assert the fraudulent transfer claim under sec-
tions 548 or 544. If the trustee is denied the ability to assert the bulk
sales claim, it may simply be forced to try to upset the suspect trans-
action on a fraudulent transfer ground. Therefore, there appears to be
little merit in denying the trustee the ability to assert a bulk sale claim
that is so closely related to a fraudulent transfer.
In sum, it appears under the current statutory formulation and
judicial interpretations of the trustee's powers that the trustee cannot
assert creditor's claims under new Article 6. Therefore, those powers
should be changed to permit assertion of bulk sale claims, at least as
long as any corresponding claim by the buyer would be subordinated
to claims of other creditors and the trustee is limited to asserting the
amount of actual harm caused by the failure to comply with Article 6.
V. CONCLUSION
The exact scope of the trustee's avoidance powers and ability to
sue third parties for damages on behalf of creditors has been subject to
controversy and confusion. The statutes and the cases interpreting
them are not always consistent with the policies underlying the avoid-
ance powers. The trustee's powers should be amended to permit an
inquiry into whether assertion of a specific claim against a third party
would maximize assets available to pay creditors generally without
imposing an undue administrative burden on the bankruptcy estate.
If assertion of a claim would provide a net benefit to the estate, the
trustee should have the power to assert it even if it is a claim for
damages rather than transfer avoidance.
The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States prop-
erly recommended to Congress that the power of the trustee be
extended to assert creditor's claims in the best interest of the estate.
Unfortunately, Congress ultimately declined to take the Commis-
sion's recommendation. This decision should now be reexamined.
While the proposal considered and rejected by Congress should per-
haps be changed to provide more guidance to trustees about when a
claim should be asserted,2 42 a more flexible rule that provides the
power to assert some claims for money damages against third parties
is preferable to the current rules, which generally limit the trustee to
asserting claims of transfer avoidance and claims belonging to the
debtor outside of bankruptcy.
241. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1), (2) (1988).
242. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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